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Note
Regulatory Imperialism:
The Worldwide Export of European
Regulatory Principles on Credit Rating
Agencies
Kristina St. Charles*
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are widely cited as key
contributors to the recent global financial crisis, particularly for
their role in the growth of the asset-backed securities debt
market.1 As originally envisioned, collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) and related structured finance products were designed
to reduce investor risk through diversification.2 Changes in the
expected default rates among subprime mortgages in 2007
combined with declining property values actually concentrated
investor risk and created considerable uncertainty.3 This
uncertainty led to a liquidity crisis among some institutional
investors, and as the crisis worsened CRAs downgraded billions
of dollars worth of subprime residential mortgage backed
securities (RMBSs) and CDOs.4
Credit rating agencies are companies that evaluate the risk
of issuers and individual debt instruments.5 To assess the credit

* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Northwestern
University, 2008.
1. See generally Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr.
27, 2008, at 36.
2. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, 43 (2008), available at http://www.iasplus.com/
iosco/0805ioscosubprimereport.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE].
3. Id. at 3–4.
4. Id. at 4–5.
5. STANDARD & POOR’S FIN. SVCS., GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 3
(2009),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/
SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf. Issuers include corporations, financial institutions,
national governments, states, cities, and municipalities. Id. at 7.
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risk of issuers, the CRAs analyze both financial and nonfinancial factors, including economic circumstances, corporate
governance attributes, and key performance indicators.6 The
conclusions derived from this analysis are then reflected in a
credit rating. This credit rating is an opinion about the credit
risk of the issue or issuer, and reflects the CRA’s opinion as to
the likelihood that the issuer will be able to meet its financial
obligation or that the debt instrument will default.7 Credit
ratings are not absolute measures of default probability, are not
intended to indicate the value of merit of an investment, and are
not recommendations to buy or sell a security.8 Despite CRAs
stressing that their ratings are simply opinions, investors have
relied heavily on these ratings as their method of assessing the
credit risk of RMBSs and CDOs.9 As a result, when CRA ratings
of these instruments were questioned due to the high level of
downgrades, investors did not have an independent way to
assess the securities’ risks, causing the market for the securities
to dislocate.10
Despite the importance of credit rating agencies in most
modern capital markets, CRAs remained primarily selfregulated until fairly recently.11 Regulators first began taking
notice of CRAs after they failed to downgrade Enron until very
shortly before its collapse.12 International securities regulators
were the first to take action by promulgating a non-binding code
of conduct for CRAs in 2004.13 In 2006, the United States passed

6. Id. at 11–12 (additionally considering competitive trends, product mix
considerations, research and development prospects, patent rights, and labor
relations). For an assessment of individual issues CRAs evaluate credit quality and
likelihood of default based on information concerning the legal structure, relative
seniority of the issuer with regard to the issuer’s other debts, and the existence of
external support or credit enhancements. See id.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 3.
9. IOSCO, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 23. Reasons for overreliance on ratings included the complexity of the structured finance products, the
limited historical performance data available on some types of assets underlying the
RMBSs, and the lack of universally understood valuation methods and price
discovery mechanism in the secondary market. Id.
10. Id.
11. HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 67–68 (2008).
12. Id. at 68–69.
13. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CODE OF CONDUCT
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2004), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf
[hereinafter
IOSCO,
CODE OF CONDUCT].
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the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act,14 becoming the first
jurisdiction in the world to implement binding regulations on
CRAs.15 The European Union passed the most comprehensive
regulation of CRAs to date in April 2009, which is set to go into
effect beginning in December 2010.16
This Note analyzes the current regulatory regimes of the
United States and the European Union, and the practical effects
these regulations will have on credit rating agencies worldwide.
Part I briefly outlines the history of credit rating agency
regulation in the United States and the European Union, as
well as the actions taken by international securities regulators.
Part II compares the regulation passed by the European Union
to current regulations in the United States, focusing on five
areas: the scope of the regulations, corporate governance and
conflicts of interest, methodologies and quality of credit ratings,
disclosure and transparency, and structured finance
instruments. Part II argues that in order to eliminate the
potential extraterritorial and anticompetitive effects of the
European Union’s regulation, regulators in the European Union
must find that the regulatory regime currently in place in the
United States is equivalent to that of the European Union. This
Note concludes that further bilateral dialogues on the
implementation of the EU regulations are necessary to
eliminate the potentially adverse cross-border impact that
differing regulatory approaches in the United States and
European Union could have on global market participants.
I. FROM SELF-REGULATION TO AN INTRICATE
REGULATORY REGIME: THE EVOLUTION OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCY REGULATION
A. REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES
Since the early twentieth century, CRAs have provided
14. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
15. Pavlos Maris, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the US and
Europe: Historical Analysis and Thoughts on the Road Ahead 11 (July 15, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434504; see
generally Deniz Coskun, Credit Rating Agencies in a Post-Enron World: Congress
Revisits the NRSRO Concept, 9 J. OF BANKING REG., 264, 264–283 (2008).
16. Council Regulation 1060/2009, art. 41, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1–31 (EC).
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ratings on the creditworthiness of issuers of securities and
individual debt instruments.17 Over time the development of
increasingly complex financial products, such as asset-backed
securities, and the globalization of financial markets
significantly increased the importance and influence of CRAs.18
Despite performing a crucial function in international capital
markets, CRAs have not been subject to the same regulatory
scrutiny as securities firms or banks,19 remaining largely selfregulated within the United States.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) first began recognizing the ratings of certain CRAs
in its federal securities regulations in 1975, designating firms as
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs) for purposes of its net capital rules.20 Over the years,
the concept of NRSROs was further incorporated into numerous
SEC rules, granting favorable regulatory treatment to
institutions whose portfolio holdings consisted of securities
rated highly by NRSROs.21
The term NRSRO was not defined in any of these rules and
regulations. Instead, the SEC issued no-action letters granting
recognition of NRSRO status on a case-by-case basis, originally
only to Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (Moody’s), Standard and
Poor’s Corporation (S&P) and Fitch Investors Service, Inc.

17. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. Securities Markets: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 131 (2002) [hereinafter
Role of CRAs Hearing] (statement of Issac C. Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission).
18. Id. at 131.
19. See DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 11, at 68.
20. See Adoption of Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 and Adoption of Alternative
Net Capital Requirements for Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 11497, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,795 (July 16, 1975) (incorporating the term “NRSRO” for
determining capital charges on different grades of debt securities under the net
capital rule). “The net capital rule requires broker-dealers, when computing net
capital, to deduct from their net worth certain percentages of the market value
(‘haircuts’) of their proprietary securities positions . . . to provide a margin of safety
against losses that might be incurred by broker-dealers as a result of market
fluctuations.” Role of CRAs Hearing, supra note 17, at 132 (statement of Issac C.
Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
21. See, e.g., SEC Money Market Funds Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(9) (2009)
(exempting money market funds from certain valuation requirements if their
portfolios are limited to securities with particular NRSRO ratings); SEC Forms for
Registration Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2009) (allowing non-convertible debt
securities rated investment grade by at least one NRSRO to be registered on Form
S-3 and forego other regulations).
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(Fitch).22 A rating agency’s designation as an NRSRO “did not
carry any implication that the SEC approved the ratings
methodologies, or had any oversight of the agencies’
operations.”23 Instead, the SEC determined whether a CRA
should be designated an NRSRO by asking whether the rating
agency was widely accepted in the United States as an issuer of
credible and reliable ratings.24 As a result, the designation was
“intended largely to reflect the view of the marketplace as to the
credibility of the ratings, rather than represent a ‘seal of
approval’ of a federal regulatory agency.”25
Enron’s collapse in 2001 pushed regulation of CRAs to the
forefront, in large part because Enron’s rating remained at
investment grade until four days before the company went
bankrupt.26 Congress quickly began investigating the role of
CRAs in Enron’s collapse,27 finding a lack of diligence in the
CRAs’ assessments of Enron as the primary cause of Enron’s
erroneous investment grade rating.28 Based on these findings,

22. See Letter from Gregory C. Yadley, Staff Attorney, Div. of Mkt. Regulation,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Ralph L. Gosselin, Treasurer, Couglin and Co., Inc.
(Nov. 24, 1975), 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2602. Between 1975 and 1992, only four
other rating agencies were given NRSRO status: Duff and Phelps, Inc., McCarthy
Crisanti & Maffei, Inc., IBCA Limited and its subsidiary, IBCA, Inc., and Thomson
BankWatch, Inc, all of which have since merged with or been acquired by another
agency. See Role of CRAs Hearing, supra note 17, at 134 (statement of Issac C.
Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
23. DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 11, at 68.
24. See Role of CRAs Hearing, supra note 17, at 133 (statement of Issac C.
Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
25. Id. at 133.
26. See Edward Wyatt, Credit Rating Agencies Waited Months to Voice Doubt
About Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at C1.
27. On March 20, 2002 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a
hearing with representatives from the major CRAs as well as the then-SEC
Commissioner and various law professors. See Rating the Raters: Enron and the
Credit Rating Agencies: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. 8 (2002) (testimony of John C. Diaz, Managing Director, Power and
Energy Group, Moody’s Investor Service). In addition, on July 23, 2002,
representatives from Moody’s and S&P testified regarding their role in Enron’s
misleading structured finance transactions. See The Role of the Financial
Institutions in Enron’s Collapse: Hearings Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 278 (2002) (joint
statement of John C. Diaz, Managing Director, Power and Energy Group, Moody’s
Investor Service & Pamela M. Stumpp, Managing Director, Chief Credit Officer,
Corporate Finance Group, Moody’s Investor Service); id. at 282 (statement of Ronald
M. Barone, Managing Director, Utilities, Energy and Project Finance Group,
Corporate and Government Ratings, Standard and Poor’s Financial Service).
28. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG.,
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 89–98
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Congress called for the direct regulation of CRAs by the SEC.29
Over the next few years, Congress conducted additional
investigations,30 culminating in the SEC’s proposal of a
definition of NRSRO in 2005.31
In 2006 Congress responded by enacting the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 (Rating Agency Act),32 signaling the
first formal regulation of CRAs in the United States. The Rating
Agency Act defines the term “NRSRO” and provides authority
for the Commission to implement rules regarding the
registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting, and oversight of
CRAs.33 The Rating Agency Act also outlines registration
(Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON]; see also, STAFF
OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., ENRON’S CREDIT RATING:
ENRON’S BANKERS’ CONTACTS WITH MOODY’S AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 2–17
(Comm. Print 2003).
29. FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON, supra note 28, at 98–100.
30. For example, the Commission, pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
issued the Report on the Role and Function of CRAs in the Operation of Securities
Markets in January 2003. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND
FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf.
This report listed multiple issues in need of further study. See id. at 1–2 (listing
information flow, potential conflicts of interest, alleged anticompetitive or unfair
practices, reducing potential regulatory barriers to entry and ongoing oversight as
issues requiring further study). The SEC subsequently issued a Concept Release,
calling for comment on these issues. See Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit
Ratings Under Federal Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 8236, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,972, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,066, 68 Fed. Reg.
35,258 (June 12, 2003).
31. See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization,
Securities Act Release No. 8570, Exchange Act Release No. 51,572, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,834, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr. 19, 2005). The
proposed definition of NRSRO is an entity:
(i) that issues publicly available credit ratings that are current
assessments of the creditworthiness of obligors with respect to specific
securities or money market instruments; (ii) is generally accepted in the
financial markets as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings, including
ratings for a particular industry or geographic segment, by the
predominant users of securities ratings; and (iii) uses systematic
procedures designated to ensure credible and reliable ratings, manage
potential conflicts of interest, and prevent the misuse of nonpublic
information, and has sufficient financial resources to ensure compliance
with those procedures.
Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. at
21,310.
32. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33. Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 55,857, 72 Fed. Reg.
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procedures for NRSROs34 and calls for almost all the
information submitted in a CRA’s registration application to be
available to the public.35 Perhaps most importantly, the Rating
Agency Act specifically prohibits the SEC from regulating “the
substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies
by which any nationally recognized statistical rating
organization determines credit ratings.”36
The rules enacted by the SEC in 200737 pursuant to the
Rating Agency Act require CRAs seeking registration as
NRSROs to follow certain procedures,38 and require NRSROs to
make and retain certain records,39 file annual financial

33,564 (June 5, 2007). NRSRO is defined as:
A credit rating agency that: (A) has been in business as a credit rating
agency for at least the 3 consecutive years immediately preceding the date
of its application for registration under section 15E; (B) issues credit
ratings certified by qualified institutional buyers, in accordance with
section 15E(a)(1)(B)(ix), with respect to – (i) financial institutions, brokers
or dealers; (ii) insurance companies; (iii) corporate issuers; (iv) issuers of
asset-backed securities . . . (v) issuers of government securities, municipal
securities, or securities issued by a foreign government; or (vi) a
combination of one or more categories of obligors described in any clauses
(i) through (v); (C) is registered under section 15E.
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 3 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(62)).
34. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)
to require, among other things, disclosure of performance measurement statistics,
procedures and methodologies, policies, organizational structure, and conflicts of
interest in applications for registration as an NRSRO).
35. See id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(3) to allow lists of the twenty largest
issuers and subscribers of credit rating services, amount of net revenues received
therefrom, and written certifications in registration applications from institutional
buyers to remain confidential).
36. Id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)). The SEC finds this provision to
strike the proper balance between promoting competition and policing NRSRO
activities without second-guessing the quality of the CRAs’ ratings. See The Role
and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 48 (2007)
[hereinafter Role and Impact Hearing] (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
37. Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 33,564.
38. See SEC Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
Registration Rule, 17 C.F.R § 240.17g-1 (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010) (requiring
registration, annual certification, and the furnishing of form NRSRO).
39. See id. § 240.17g-2 (requiring records on the identities of credit analysts
that participated in determining the credit rating, the identity of the person who
approved the credit rating, whether the credit rating was solicited or unsolicited,
financial reports, compliance reports, internal audit plans, credit analysis reports,
and documentation of complaints, among other things).
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reports,40 implement written policies and procedures to prevent
the misuse of material nonpublic information,41 and disclose
conflicts of interest.42 NRSROs are also prohibited from
engaging in unfair, coercive, or abusive practices.43
Shortly after these rules were implemented CRAs began
receiving heavy criticism regarding the accuracy of the ratings
of structured finance products, specifically subprime RMBSs
and CDOs,44 as thousands of ratings of RMBSs and CDOs worth
billions of dollars were downgraded.45 The massive downgrades
led to market uncertainty and a general reduction in market
liquidity.46 According to the SEC, a primary flaw in the rating
process is the fact that arrangers of RMBSs and CDOs would
inform the CRAs of the rating they wished to obtain for each
product and the credit analysts would simply check whether the
assets were sufficient to support the desired rating.47
40. See id. § 240.17g-3.
41. See id. § 240.17g-4.
42. See id. § 240.17g-5.
43. See id. § 240.17g-6.
44. See Role and Impact Hearing, supra note 36, at 49 (statement of
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); id. at 53–
60 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School); see
also Elliot Blair Smith, Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime
Scourge, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601109&sid=ah839IWTLP9s; Joshua Rosner, Op-Ed., Stopping the
Subprime Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A19; Lowenstein, supra note 1.
45. See DANIELLE NAZARIAN & MARIA MIAGKOVA, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV.,
CREDIT MIGRATION OF CDO NOTES, 1996-2007, FOR US AND EUROPEAN
TRANSACTIONS 2 (2008), available at http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/
content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20pages/Credit%20Policy%20Research/
documents/current/2007100000486949.pdf (reporting 1448 tranche downgrades in
515 CDOs during 2007, nine times the number of tranches downgraded in 2006);
RAMKI MUTHUKRISHNAN & KATE SCANLIN, STANDARD & POOR’S FIN. SERVS., 78
RATINGS LOWERED ON 16 U.S. CDOS OF ABS; $14.871 BILLION IN ISSUANCE
AFFECTED 2 (2008), available at http://www2.standardsandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/
subprime_78cdo_073108.pdf (reporting that as of July 31, 2008, S&P had
downgraded $376.792 billion in CDO issuance); Glenn Costello, Fitch Ratings,
PowerPoint: Update on U.S. RMBS: Performance, Expectations, Criteria 6 (2008),
http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/subprime/us_rmbs_update_feb08.pdf
(reporting downgrading $23.8 billion worth of subprime RMBS tranches issued in
2006 and the first quarter of 2007).
46. The State of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 13–14 (2008),
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
9e0f8915-32d6-425e-8e77-7b9ce0e555b7 (statement of John C. Dugan, Comptroller
of the Currency).
47. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (proposed
June 25, 2008).
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Additionally, investigators found many factors contributed to
the inaccurate ratings of RMBSs and CDOs, including:
perceived lack of transparency,48 underestimation of credit risk
and faulty assumptions underlying rating methodologies,49 as
well as conflicts of interest in the “issuer pays” model, high
market concentration of CRAs, and the prospect of retaliation by
arrangers.50
Based on these concerns, the SEC promulgated various rule
amendments imposing additional requirements on NRSROs in
June 2008.51 The SEC adopted the majority of these
amendments, with revisions, in February 2009 intending to
increase the transparency of rating methodologies, strengthen
the disclosure of ratings performances, prohibit NRSROs from
engaging in particular practices that create conflicts of interest,
and enhance recordkeeping and reporting obligations.52 All
NRSROs were required to comply with the majority of these
48. The State of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2008), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
093111d0-c4fe-47f3-a87a-b103f0513f7a (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
49. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT ON
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 16 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf.
50. See Role and Impact Hearing, supra note 36, at 3–7 (statement of John C.
Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School).
51. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
73 Fed. Reg. at 36,212 (implementing further regulations “in order to address
concerns about the integrity of [CRAs’] credit rating procedures and methodologies
in the light of the role they played in determining credit ratings for securities
collateralized by or linked to subprime residential mortgages.”).
52. See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 59,342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 9, 2009).
Specifically, the rule amendments require:
(1) an NRSRO to provide enhanced disclosure of performance
measurements statistics and the procedures and methodologies used by the
NRSRO in determining credit ratings for structured finance products and
other debt securities on Form NRSRO; (2) an NRSRO to make, keep, and
preserve additional records under Rule 17g-2; (3) an NRSRO to make
publicly available on its Internet Web site in XBRL format a random
sample of 10% of the ratings histories of credit ratings paid for by the
obligor being rated or by the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security
being rated (“issuer-paid credit ratings”) in each class of credit ratings for
which it has issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit ratings, with each new
ratings action to be reflected in such histories no later than six months
after they are taken; and (4) an NRSRO to furnish the Commission with an
additional annual report.
Id. at 6469.
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amendments beginning April 10, 2009.53 Additional rule
amendments adopted by the SEC on November 23, 2009
implement new requirements for ratings of structured finance
products and require broader disclosure of credit rating
histories.54 The SEC has also issued proposed rules on
disclosure of compliance reviews and revenue sources, and is
soliciting comments regarding new rules related to ratings of
structured finance instruments.55
B. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
As international financial markets became more complex
and CRAs began issuing ratings across borders, international
regulatory agencies responded by developing detailed informal
systems to coordinate regulation efforts. The International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)56 first took
notice of CRAs in 2003 when it issued its Report on the
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies57 and corresponding
Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies
(Principles).58 The IOSCO Principles “state high-level objectives
for which ratings agencies, regulators, issuers and other market
53. See id. at 6456. The amendment to Rule 17g-2(d) did not go into effect until
September 9, 2009. See Order Providing NRSROs a Temporary Exemption from the
Requirement in Rule 17g-2(d), Exhange Act Release No. 60,473, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,176,
41,177 (Aug. 14, 2009).
54. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832–35 (Dec. 4,
2009).
55. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 61,051, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,866 (proposed Dec. 4, 2009)
(deferring consideration of a proposed rule that would require a report describing
credit rating procedures and methodologies and credit risk characteristics for
structured finance products, and soliciting comment regarding methods to
differentiate ratings of structured finance products).
56. IOSCO is recognized as the international standard-setter for securities
markets, with IOSCO members regulating more than 90% of the world’s securities
in over 100 jurisdictions. See About IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=history (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
57. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD153.pdf (providing an overview of key issues for
regulators, citing CRA independence and conflicts of interest, issuers and
disclosures, public dissemination of ratings and market timing, preferential
subscriber access to information, and unsolicited ratings as the greatest issues
facing regulators).
58. TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2003),
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf.
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participants should strive in order to improve investor
protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of the
securities markets and reduce systemic risk.”59 The Principles
cover four primary areas: (1) quality and integrity of the rating
process; (2) independence and conflicts of interests; (3)
transparency and timelines of ratings disclosure; and (4)
confidential information.60
In 2004, IOSCO published a Code of Conduct Fundamentals
for Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO Code of Conduct or Code)61
to serve as a guide and framework for how CRAs should
implement the Principles in their individual codes of conduct;62
the “Code is the international consensus on what regulators
expect of CRAs with regard to: (1) transparency; (2) conflicts of
interest; (3) CRA obligations to the investing public and issuers;
(4) quality and integrity of the rating process; and (5) treatment
of non-public information.”63 The IOSCO Code of Conduct is also
intended to serve as a template for regulation to avoid conflicts
of law between different approaches to CRA regulation by
individual jurisdictions.64 For these goals to be met, individual
CRAs must incorporate the IOSCO Code of Conduct into their
own codes of conduct. However, in 2007 IOSCO found that while
the largest CRAs had implemented the Code extensively, many
small and mid-sized firms had either only partially
implemented the Code, or simply not implemented it at all.65
IOSCO has no power to force CRAs to implement the Code; it
can merely provide guidance for self-regulation or a basis for
59. Id. at 1.
60. See id. at 2–4.
61. IOSCO, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 13.
62. See id. at 2.
63. Letter from Greg Tanzer, Sec’y Gen., IOSCO, to Mario Draghi, Chairman,
Fin. Stability Forum, Tiff Macklem, Assoc. Deputy Minister, Can. Dep’t of Fin., and
Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India (June 30, 2008) in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES
LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 1167
(2009).
64. See id. at 1168.
65. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CONSULTATION
REPORT: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO FUNDAMENTALS OF A CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 15 (2007), available at http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD233.pdf. Many of the CRAs contained in IOSCO’s
implementation review submitted comments clarifying or explaining their
implementation. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, COMMENTS
RECEIVED ON THE CONSULTATION REPORT: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IOSCO FUNDAMENTALS OF A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
(2007), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD249.pdf.
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laws established in individual jurisdictions.66
As the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States
triggered extensive worldwide market disruption, international
securities bodies increased their scrutiny of CRAs. In October
2007, the G-7 tasked the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) with
analyzing the underlying causes of the crisis, including, among
other things, an examination of the methodologies and role of
CRAs in structured finance transactions.67 The FSF report
called for changing the role and use of credit ratings to enhance
the resilience of the global system and preserve the advantages
of integrated global financial markets.68 The report also
recommended that IOSCO revise its CRA Code of Conduct and
CRAs quickly revise their own codes of conduct accordingly.69
IOSCO also conducted an inquiry into the role of CRAs in
structured finance markets.70 Based on this analysis and the
proposals put forth by the FSF, IOSCO released its revised CRA
Code of Conduct in May 2008,71 implementing numerous

66. See OLIVER VON SCHWEINITZ, RATING AGENCIES: THEIR BUSINESS,
REGULATION, AND LIABILITY UNDER U.S., U.K., AND GERMAN LAW 10–11 (2007)
(describing IOSCO’s Code of Conduct as “soft-law”).
67. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement of G-7 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Oct. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp625.htm.
68. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON
ENHANCING
MARKET
AND
INSTITUTIONAL
RESILIENCE
2
(2008),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf (additionally proposing
the strengthening of prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management,
enhancing transparency and valuation, strengthening the authorities’
responsiveness to risks, and creating robust arrangements for dealing with stress in
the financial system).
69. See id. at 34. The FSF also suggested that CRAs allocate adequate
resources to both the initial rating and the rating’s regular review, differentiate the
rating symbols used for structured products from those used on bonds, expand the
initial and ongoing information provided on risk characteristics of structured
products, and enhance review of the quality of the data input and due diligence
performed on structured products. See id. at 34–37. The FSF further asked investors
to address their over-reliance on ratings, and asked authorities to review their use of
ratings in regulatory and supervisory frameworks. See id. at 37–38.
70. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL REPORT ON THE
ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008),
available
at
http://www.cmvm.pt/NR/rdonlyres/85312A11-A927-4F63-810A082C1A2CF5F8/9759/RelIOSCOsobrePapelCRAMercProdEstrut.pdf
[hereinafter
IOSCO, FINAL REPORT] (finding that the IOSCO Code of Conduct should be modified
to better address CRA transparency and market perceptions, independence and
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and CRA competition and the interaction this
competition may have on CRA independence).
71. TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CODE OF CONDUCT
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008), available at
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changes, many of which were aimed at how CRAs conduct
themselves with regard to ratings of structured finance
products.72 Additionally, IOSCO sought greater international
coordination of CRA oversight, asking “legislators to consider
the regulatory consensus represented by the IOSCO Code of
Conduct when framing legislation as any fragmentation runs
the risk of a reoccurrence of problems with product ratings.”73
Despite this recommendation, regulatory gaps became evident
in the midst of the economic crisis.74 In response, the G-20 called
for immediate action by March 31, 2009:
Regulators should take steps to ensure that credit rating agencies
meet the highest standards of [ISOCO] and that they avoid conflicts of
interest, provide greater disclosure to investors and to issuers, and
differentiate ratings for complex products. This will help ensure that
credit rating agencies have the right incentives and appropriate
oversight to enable them to perform their important role in providing
unbiased information and assessments to markets. [IOSCO] should
review credit rating agencies’ adoption of the standards mechanisms
for monitoring compliance.75

Pursuant to the G-20’s directive, IOSCO issued a review of
the implementation of the revised IOSCO CRA Code in March
2009,76 finding that the largest CRAs had substantially
implemented the revisions, but that two-thirds of the CRAs
surveyed had not addressed the revisions at all.77 In April 2009,

http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf
[hereinafter
IOSCO,
REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT].
72. See Letter from Greg Tanzer to Mario Draghi, Tiff Macklem, and Rakesh
Mohan, supra note 63, at 1168.
73. Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Urges Greater
International Coordination in the Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Sept. 17,
2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS126.pdf.
74. See Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Open Letter to G-20
Summit
(Nov.12,
2008),
available
at
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/
IOSCONEWS133.pdf (highlighting the risks posed by unregulated and underregulated parts of the global market).
75. GROUP OF TWENTY, DECLARATION: SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
THE WORLD ECONOMY: ACTION PLAN TO IMPLEMENT PRINCIPLES OF REFORM 2 (2008),
available at http://www.g20.org/documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf.
76. TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, A REVIEW OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD286.pdf.
77. See id. at 8 (citing several possible reasons why the revised code had not
been adopted, including the European Commission’s proposed regulation, resource
constraints, and the fact that many of the revisions were aimed at addressing
concerns with structured finance product ratings, which many smaller CRAs do not
offer).
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the G-20 implemented an action plan for global recovery and
reform and agreed to “extend regulatory oversight and
registration to Credit Rating Agencies to ensure they meet the
international code of good practice, particularly to prevent
unacceptable conflicts of interest.”78
IOSCO recently developed a model for IOSCO members
who regulate and inspect CRAs intended to create “a common
understanding of the types of information that regulators
around the world will find useful when inspecting a CRA
against regulatory requirements based on the IOSCO CRA
Code.”79 Additionally, the IOSCO Task Force on Credit Rating
Agencies is being converted into a permanent standing
committee in order to facilitate the convergence of regulatory
approaches to CRAs.80 The G-20 continues to focus on
strengthening oversight of CRAs, and progress is being made
worldwide.81
C. REGULATION OF CRAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union (EU or Community) also took notice of
CRAs after Enron’s collapse raised a number of international
policy issues.82 At the Oviedo Informal Economic and Financial
Affairs Council in April 2002, the European Commission (EC)
called for a cross-sectoral policy assessment to determine
whether regulatory intervention in the area of CRAs was
78. GROUP OF TWENTY, GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM 4 (2009),
available at http://www.g20.org/documents/final-communique.pdf.
79. Letter from Greg Tanzer to Mario Draghi, Tiff Macklem, and Rakesh
Mohan, supra note 63, at 1168 (covering areas such as quality and integrity of the
rating process, analyst and employee independence, and compliance).
80. See Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Update on Credit
Rating Agency Oversight 3–4 (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/
news/pdf/IOSCONEWS138.pdf (describing the permanent standing committee and
the purposes it hopes to accomplish).
81. See U.S. CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURGH G-20 SUMMIT, PROGRESS REPORT ON
THE ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 18–19 (2009), available
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf (finding
that progress has been made with CRAs incorporating the Revised IOSCO Code of
Conduct, and finding that regulators are working together to obtain compatible
regulatory obligations for CRAs).
82. See European Comm’n, Internal Mkt. and Serv. Directorate Gen. [DG
MARKT], Note for the Informal ECOFIN Council in Oviedo, Spain: A First Response
to Enron Related Policy Issues, 1, (2002) (prepared by Frits Bolkestein), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/enron/ecofin_2004_04_enron_en.pdf
(listing financial reporting, statutory audit, corporate governance, transparency in
the international financial system, financial analysts’ research, and the role of
rating agencies as issues of concern in the EU).
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necessary within the EU.83 The European Parliament’s
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs investigated the
role of CRAs in European capital markets, concluding that
“rating agencies active in Europe should be asked to register
with a European Union Ratings Authority.”84 Based on this
report, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for
the EC to assess whether such a registration scheme should be
established and whether regulatory legislation was needed.85
In March 2004, the EC presented the European Securities
Committee86 with four main issues of concern: (1) the legal
treatment of rating agencies’ access to inside information; (2)
the transparency of rating methodologies; (3) the lack of
competition among CRAs; and (4) conflicts of interest within
rating agencies.87 The EC then called on the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR)88 to provide the EC
with technical advice related to those four issues.89 CESR issued
a comprehensive report in March 2005 stating, among other
things, that they did not think EU rules should extend beyond
the IOSCO Code of Conduct, and that the IOSCO Code of
83. Id. at 7.
84. Commission’s Report on Role and Methods of Rating Agencies, at 11,
A5-0040/2004 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2004-0040+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
(supporting the explanatory statement of the Motion for a Resolution on Role and
Method of Rating Agencies 2003/2081(INI)).
85. Resolution on Role and Methods of Rating Agencies, EUR. PARL. DOC.
2003/2081(INI) 5 (2004) (provisional edition). The European Parliament also called
upon the Commission to work closely with IOSCO and other securities market
regulators to ensure any developments are globally consistent. Id. at 5.
86. The European Securities Committee, run by the European Commission,
was formed in 2001 and provides advice on policy issues in the securities field.
European Commission, European Securities Committee, http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/securities/esc/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
87. See European Comm’n, European Sec. Comm., Summary Record of the 19th
Meeting of the European Securities Committee/Alternates, 6, ESC 10/2004 (Mar. 15,
2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esc/meetings/
2004-03-report_en.pdf.
88. The Committee of European Securities Regulators was formed in 2001 as
an independent advisory body to advise the Commission on technical details of
securities litigation. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Financial Services:
Commission Creates Two New Committees on Securities 2 (June 6, 2001), available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/
792&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN.
89. See European Comm’n, Call to CESR for Technical Advice on Possible
Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies (July 27, 2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/agencies/2004-07-27-advice_en.pdf
(asking CESR for advice on specific questions to assess the need for legislation or
other solutions).
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Conduct will improve the quality of the rating process and
enhance transparency.90 CESR also stressed the need for a
worldwide uniform approach to regulation of CRAs and
encouraged close coordination between regulators in Europe and
the United States.91 The EC’s own investigation generated the
same conclusion, finding that the directives currently in place,92
along with the self-regulation of CRAs based on the IOSCO
Code of Conduct, sufficiently answered many of the EC’s
concerns and no new legislative initiatives were needed.93
After deciding that CRAs in the EU would remain selfregulated for the time being, the EC and CESR developed a
strategy for reviewing the implementation of the IOSCO Code of
Conduct.94 CESR’s initial investigation, published in December
2006, found that most CRA codes complied with the IOSCO
Code of Conduct with two major exceptions: ancillary services
and unsolicited ratings.95 CESR’s second report on CRA

90. Comm. of European Sec. Regulators [CESR], CESR’s Technical Advice to
the European Commission on Possible Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies,
at 50–51, CESR Doc. CESR/05-139b (Mar. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=3157 [hereinafter CESR, Technical Advice].
91. See id. at 53.
92. The Market Abuse Directive applies to CRAs, in addition to other financial
institutions, and mandates disclosure of conflicts of interest to clients and the fair
presentation of investment recommendations. Council Directive 2003/6, On Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), art. 6.5, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16–22.
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive applies only to those CRAs
undertaking investment services, and imposes a number of rules on organizational
structure and operating conditions, including disclosure of conflicts of interest.
Council Directive 2004/39, On Markets in Financial Instruments, arts. 13–18, 2004
O.J. (L 145) 14–17.
93. Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies, 2006 O.J.
(C 59) 2–6.
94. CESR, CESR’s Report to the European Commission on the Compliance of
Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code, ¶ 2, CESR Doc. CESR/06-545 (Dec.
2006), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=4093. The process
involved each CRA writing a letter explaining how it had complied with the IOSCO
Code of Conduct and how it had deviated from it, an annual meeting between CESR
and the CRAs to discuss implementation issues, and each CRA providing CESR with
an explanation for any substantial incidents that occurred with a particular issuer
in its market. Id. ¶ 3.
95. See id. ¶¶ 38–49. Many CRAs did not adopt provision 2.5 of the IOSCO
Code of Conduct requiring CRAs to operationally and legally separate the credit
rating business and CRA analysts from any other business that may create a conflict
of interest because the CRAs do not consider “rating assessment services” ancillary
services. Id. ¶ 42. Rating assessment services refer to situations where CRAs
provide issuers with the likely impact various hypothetical events, such as a merger
or differences in how the debt is structured, will have on a rating. Id. The CRAs also
chose not to comply with provision 3.9 of the IOSCO Code of Conduct which requires
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compliance with the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct, published
in May 2008, found that some of the improvements suggested in
the 2006 report had been implemented, but CESR’s expectations
for improvement were only partially met.96 This second report
also contained an analysis of the role of CRAs in structured
finance.97 CESR found that while changes needed to be
implemented in the areas of transparency, human resources,
monitoring of ratings, and conflicts of interest,98 there was “no
evidence that regulation of the credit rating industry would
have had an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings” of
U.S. RMBSs and CDOs, and consequently, CESR continued to
support market-driven improvements.99 However, CESR did
recommend that the EC form a CRA standard-setting and
monitoring body to develop international standards for the
credit rating industry.100
The European Securities Market Expert Group (ESME)101
also published a report on the role of CRAs in structured finance
in 2006, reaching similar conclusions.102 Due to concerns about
CRAs to disclose their policies and procedures regarding unsolicited ratings,
whether the issuer participated in the rating process, and whether the rating was
initiated at the request of the issuer because all the CRAs had different
interpretations of what an unsolicited rating should be. Id. ¶ 46.
96. CESR, CESR’s Second Report to the European Commission on the
Compliance of Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code and the Role of Credit
Rating Agencies in Structured Finance, ¶ 225, CESR Doc. CESR/08-277 (May 2008),
available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=5049.
97. See id. ¶¶ 90–206.
98. See id. For example, CESR recommended that CRAs clearly communicate
the characteristics and limitations of the ratings of structured finance products,
critical model assumptions including economic explanations for the assumptions,
and the particular methodologies used in the ratings. See id. ¶¶ 121–146. CESR
further believed the market would benefit from greater transparency with regard to
failed or non-issued ratings because it would help alleviate market concerns over the
integrity of the rating process in structured finance products. See id. ¶ 205.
99. Id. ¶ 7.
100. Id. ¶ 269. CESR urged the EC to immediately contact the relevant
international authorities with the aim of setting up a single international group to
ensure a global perspective on standard setting and monitoring. Id. ¶¶ 270–275.
101. The European Securities Market Expert Group was established in March
2006 to provide legal, economic, and technical advice to the EC on the application of
EU securities directives, as well as on issues of contemporary relevance in the EU
securities markets including credit rating agencies and financial analysts. See
Commission Decision 2006/288, art. 2, 2006 O.J. (L106) 1, 3 (EC).
102. EUROPEAN SEC. MKT. EXPERT GROUP [ESME], ROLE OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES 8 (June 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/
docs/agencies/report_040608_en.pdf (“Given the global nature of the business of
CRAs and the existing US law, we have doubts as to whether the development of a
separate EU law would produce any particular benefits . . . . We think that
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whether development of a separate EU law would produce any
benefits, ESME advocated for an advisory group consisting of
investors/users, issuers, banks, credit experts, and the SEC to
provide CESR with an informed market perspective in order to
enable it to review CRAs effectively.103
The European Commission rejected CESR and ESME’s
advice for continued self-regulation, believing stronger oversight
was necessary in light of the economic crisis, and that CRAs
should be subject to registration in the EU.104 In order to
develop its own CRA regulation, the European Commission
sought input on proposed regulatory options relating to CRA
authorization and supervisory processes, in addition to a
proposed directive.105 Many international securities regulators
The
European
criticized
the
proposed
regulation.106
Securitisation Forum107 and the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association108 raised numerous concerns over
regulatory cooperation in this sphere is essential to avoid duplication of effort.”).
103. Id. at 22. ESME even stated that “full formal regulation may be
counterproductive as it might be seen by users in the market place to imply a level
of official endorsement of ratings which is neither justified nor feasible.” Id.
104. DG MARKT, Proposal for a Regulatory Framework for Credit Rating
Agencies, at 2 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/
docs/securities_agencies/consultation-cra-framework_en.pdf.
The
European
Commission explained why it believed self-regulation of CRAs was insufficient:
Self-regulation based on voluntary compliance with the IOSCO code does
not appear to offer an adequate, reliable solution to the structural
deficiencies of the business. While the industry has come up with several
schemes for self-regulation, most of these have not been robust and or
stringent enough to cope with the severe problems and restore the
confidence in the markets. Moreover, individual approaches by some of the
credit rating agencies would not have the market-wide effect necessary to
establish a level playing field across the EU and preferably worldwide.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit
Rating Agencies, at 4, COM (2008) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2008).
105. See DG MARKT, supra note 104, at 1–33 (recommending various
regulatory options and offering a proposed text of a directive/regulation on credit
rating agencies).
106. See generally Letter from Rick Watson, Managing Dir., European
Securitisation Forum, & Bertrand Huet-Delaherse, Managing Dir., European Legal
& Regulatory Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass’n, to DG MARKT (Sept. 5, 2008),
available at http://www.sifma.org/europe/docs/Response-EU-CRA-Consultation.pdf.
107. The European Securitisation Forum (ESF), now known as AFME/ESF,
addresses financial markets policy issues relating to securitization, works to build
consensus within the industry, and seeks to eliminate inefficiencies in market
regulation throughout Europe. See Association for Financial Markets in Europe,
Welcome to AFME (Association for Financial Markets in Europe),
http://afme.eu/dynamic.aspx?id=2294 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
108. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) is an
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the absence of global regulatory coordination,109 the
extraterritorial impact of the proposed legislation,110 and the
specificity of many rules which would not leave enough room for
the CRAs to exercise appropriate business and professional
judgment.111 CESR further reiterated the need for international
coordination and raised additional concerns about potential
anti-competition effects of the proposed regulation.112
Despite these concerns, the EC’s impact assessment
concluded that formal regulatory action was needed113 and the
EC released its proposed regulation in December 2008.114 The
proposed regulation had four overall objectives: (1) ensuring
CRAs avoid conflicts of interest or at least manage them
adequately; (2) improving the quality of the methodologies used
by CRAs; (3) increasing transparency by setting disclosure
obligations; and (4) ensuring an efficient registration and
surveillance framework.115
The proposal, as amended, was approved by the European
Parliament on April 23, 2009116 and the European Council
signed the regulation on September 16, 2009117 (EU CRA
Regulation), signaling the first comprehensive regulation of
CRAs in the EU. CRAs are required to apply the majority of the

organization that represents the interests of participants in the global financial
markets, including international securities firms, U.S. registered broker-dealers,
and asset managers, on regulatory and legislative issues and initiatives. SIFMA,
Welcome to SIFMA.org, http://www.sifma.org/about/about.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2010).
109. Letter from Rick Watson & Bertrand Huet-Delaherse to DG MARKT, supra
note 106, at 4–5.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 7.
112. CESR, CESR’s Response to the Consultation Document of the Commission
Services on a Draft Proposal for a Directive/Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies, at
2, CESR Doc. CESR/08-671 (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/
popup2.php?id=5222.
113. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating
Agencies: Impact Assessment, at 48, COM (2008) 704 (Nov. 12, 2008) (“Selfregulation has already been tested and has failed . . . . A legislative solution would
be a proportionate measure to fulfill the objectives of providing for a uniform CRA
regime across the EU.”).
114. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 104.
115. Id. at 4.
116. See Position of the European Parliament, COD (2009) 217 (Apr. 23, 2009),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+TC+P6-TC1-COD-2008-0217+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
117. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16.

418

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

regulation by December 7, 2010.118 The regulation contains
detailed provisions regarding conflicts of interest,119 rating
analysts,120 methodologies,121 disclosure and presentation of
transparency,123
registration,124
and
credit
ratings,122
cooperation with third countries.125 Most importantly, the scope
of the regulation extends to CRAs located outside of the
European Community, allowing the use of a credit rating issued
by a CRA located in a third country only when the rating
activities are either endorsed by a CRA located in the
Community126 or comply with certification and equivalent
requirements.127 CESR began developing aspects of the CRA
registration process in late October 2009 and must issue
guidance by May 2010.128
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT REGULATORY
REGIMES
International credit rating agencies are now subject to
conflicting regulations in the United States and the European
Union, and also may feel compelled to comply with the revised
IOSCO Code of Conduct.129 This represents a dramatic shift
from five years ago, when CRAs operated without heightened
scrutiny from government regulators. Despite the many calls for
international coordination,130 CRAs are now tasked with
118. See Id. art. 41. The provisions relating to endorsement shall apply
beginning June 7, 2011. Id.
119. Id. art. 6.
120. Id. art. 7.
121. Id. art. 8.
122. Id. art. 10.
123. Id. art. 12.
124. Id. arts. 14–20.
125. Id. arts. 34–35.
126. Id. art. 4.
127. Id. art. 5.
128. See CESR, Consultation Paper: Guidance on Registration Process,
Functioning of Colleges, Mediation Protocol, Information Set Out in Annex II,
Information Set for the Application for Certification and for the Assessment of CRAs
Systemic Importance, at 4, CESR Doc. CESR/09-955 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=6142 [hereinafter CESR, Consultation
Paper].
129. The EU CRA Regulation states that CRAs should apply the IOSCO Code of
Conduct on a voluntary basis. Council Regulation 1006/2009, supra note 16, para. 8.
130. See, e.g., CESR, Technical Advice, supra note 90, at 53; Council Regulation
1060/2009, supra note 16, arts. 34–35; Letter from Rick Watson & Bertrand HuetDelaherse to DG MARKT, supra note 106, at 4–5.
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implementing the complex rules and procedures promulgated in
the various territories. This is a significant undertaking as the
regulations permeate all aspects of the CRAs’ daily operations,
and the CRAs are required to implement the stricter of any
conflicting rules in order to ensure compliance with the laws if
they wish to issue ratings for use in the EU or the United
States.131 This section will dissect European Union regulation,
comparing it to United States regulations as well as the revised
IOSCO Code of Conduct.
A. USE OF CREDIT RATINGS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ENDORSEMENT AND CERTIFICATION
The EU CRA Regulation applies to credit ratings132 that are
publicly disclosed or distributed by subscription,133 not to
private credit ratings produced pursuant to an individual order
unintended for public disclosure or distribution by
subscription.134 The EU CRA Regulation specifies that credit
institutions, investment firms, insurance and reinsurance
undertakings, collective investment schemes, and pension funds
may only use credit ratings for regulatory purposes if they are
issued by a credit rating agency135 established in the European
Union and registered in accordance with the EU CRA
Regulation.136 One example of “regulatory purpose” is including
131. CRAs operating in the U.S. are subject to SEC regulations stemming from
the Rating Agency Act of 2006 while CRAs wishing to issue ratings for use in the
European Union would be subject to a different set of regulations in the EU CRA
Regulation. See Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
and Rated Markets 24-26 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/129,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf.
132. “Credit rating” is defined as “an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of
an entity, a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other
financial instrument, or of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt
security, preferred share or other financial instrument, issued using an established
and defined ranking system of rating categories.” Council Regulation 1060/2009,
supra note 16, art. 3(1)(a). A credit rating does not include recommendations within
the meaning of Article 1(3) of Directive 2003/125/EC, investment research or other
forms of general recommendation such as “buy,” “sell,” or “hold,” or opinions about
the value of a financial instrument or financial obligation. Id. art. 3(2).
133. Id. art. 2(1).
134. Id. art. 2(2)(a). The EU CRA Regulation also does not apply to credit scores,
credit scoring systems, credit ratings produced by export credit agencies, and credit
ratings produced by central banks. See id. art. 2(2)(b)–(d).
135. A “credit rating agency” is defined as “a legal person whose occupation
includes the issuing of credit ratings on a professional basis.” Id. art. 3(1)(b).
136. Id. art. 4(1). A “credit institution” is “an undertaking whose business is to
receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its
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a reference to a credit rating in a prospectus for a public offering
or for being listed on an exchange in the EU.137 The regulation
does not completely ban the listed institutions from using
ratings of non-EU CRAs for regulatory purposes. Instead, if an
institution wishes to utilize the credit rating issued by a CRA
located outside of the Community for a regulatory purpose, the
rating must be deemed eligible either through endorsement or
certification.138
A CRA located in the EU and registered pursuant to the EU
CRA Regulation may endorse the rating of a non-EU CRA only
if numerous conditions are satisfied. First, the endorsing EU
CRA and the non-EU CRA must belong to the same group.139
This means that any CRA based outside of the Community
which is considered systemically important, or any CRA that
wishes to qualify through endorsement rather than certification,
must establish a subsidiary within the Community.140 “Systemic
importance” is not defined in the regulation, but presumably
implies the largest CRAs based in the United States, Japan, and
Canada.141 Second, the non-EU CRA must be authorized or
registered, and subject to supervision in that third country.142
Finally, the non-EU CRA must fulfill requirements relating to
conflicts of interest, rating analysts, methodologies, outsourcing,
disclosure, and transparency which are at least as stringent as
those in the EU CRA Regulation.143 While the term “at least as
stringent” is not defined in the EU CRA Regulation, a CRA
merely complying with the U.S. Rating Agency Act and the
revised IOSCO Code of Conduct likely would not meet this
standard, as this Section will make apparent.
The endorsing EU CRA must also meet numerous
own account.” Directive 2006/48, art. 4(1), 2006 O.J. (L 177) (EC). A “regulatory
purpose” is defined as “the use of credit ratings for the specific purpose of complying
with Community law, as implemented by the national legislation of the Member
States.” Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 3(1)(g).
137. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 2(1).
138. See id. art. 4(3)–5.
139. Id. art. 4(3)(a). A “group of credit rating agencies” means a parent company
and its subsidiaries and/or affiliated companies, including those credit rating
agencies established in third countries. Id. art. 3(1)(m).
140. See id. para. 13.
141. See CESR, Call for Evidence: Fact Finding Exercise of the Use in the
European Union of Ratings Issued by Third Country CRAs, CESR Doc. CESR/09-681
(July 3, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=5785 [hereinafter
CESR, Call for Evidence].
142. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 4(3)(f).
143. See id. art. 4(3)(b).
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obligations. The EU CRA must verify that the requirements
outlined in the EU CRA Regulation are being met by the nonEU CRA,144 demonstrate that there is an objective reason for
the rating to be done in a third country,145 and make
information available to the EU regulator so the regulator can
supervise the non-EU CRA’s compliance with the EU CRA
Regulation.146 The effect of these provisions is to ensure that
any systemically important CRA based outside of the
Community is subject to the same regulations and supervision
as any CRA located in the EU, thereby forcing all non-EU CRAs
to comply with the strict provisions outlined in the EU CRA
Regulation.
Additionally, in order to qualify for endorsement, the nonEU CRA must rely on both EU and third-country regulators to
fulfill their obligations under the regulation.147 The non-EU
regulator must either prevent public authorities of the third
country from interfering with the content of CRA methodologies
and ratings,148 or establish a supervisory framework equivalent
to the EU CRA Regulation.149 Meanwhile, the EU regulator of
the “Home Member State” is responsible for assessing and
monitoring the compliance of the non-EU CRA with the
regulations.150 Both regulatory regimes are responsible for
entering into an appropriate cooperation agreement covering
the exchange of information, as well as procedures concerning
the coordination of supervisory activities.151
Alternatively, credit ratings issued by a CRA located
outside of the European Community may be used if the non-EU
CRA complies with the certification process outlined in the EU
CRA Regulation.152 Like the endorsement requirements, a nonEU CRA wishing to qualify through the certification process
must be authorized or registered in and subject to supervision in
that third country,153 and the EU and non-EU regulators must

144. Id.
145. Id. art. 4(3)(e).
146. Id. art. 4(3)(d).
147. See id. art. 4(3).
148. Id. art. 4(3)(g).
149. Id. art. 4(6).
150. Id. art. 4(3)(c). “Home Member State” is defined as the “Member State in
which the credit rating agency has its registered office.” Id. art. 3(1)(c).
151. Id. art. 4(3)(h).
152. See id. art. 5(1).
153. Id. art. 5(1)(a).
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enter into a cooperation agreement.154 The European
Commission must then adopt an equivalence decision
recognizing that the legal and supervisory framework of that
third country is equivalent to the EU CRA Regulation.155
Thereafter, the non-EU CRA must apply for certification under
the same registration process applied to CRAs located in the
European Community.156 Only CRAs deemed not to be “of
systemic importance to the financial stability or integrity of the
financial markets of one or more Member States” will be allowed
to qualify through certification.157 CESR considers the matter of
determining systemic importance an issue for competent
authorities of all member states, and has proposed that each
member state tell CESR what activities it considers to be of
systemic importance in its respective jurisdiction.158
CESR has issued some guidance on its intended approach
for determining endorsement and certification.159 CESR does
not plan on making authorities check every rating that is going
to be endorsed, but indicated that CRAs should be able to prove
at any time that all the endorsements issued comply with the
requirements of the EU CRA Regulation.160 CESR also stated
that the EU CRA must clearly identify an endorsed rating as
such.161 If a CRA seeks to have its ratings qualify for use in the
EU via certification, CESR only requires one submission for the
entire group of related CRAs.162 Once granted, the certification
would be effective for the entire territory of the European
Community.163
Both the certification and endorsement provisions could
have considerable extraterritorial implications because the EU
CRA Regulation is imposed on CRAs regardless of where they
are domiciled.164 Some CRAs have argued that the EU CRA
154. Id. art. 5(1)(c).
155. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
156. See id. art. 5(2).
157. See id. art. 5(1)(d).
158. See CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶ 84.
159. See id. ¶¶ 10–274 (seeking comment on the proposed CESR guidance).
160. See id. ¶ 70.
161. Id.
162. See id. ¶ 77.
163. Id. ¶ 79.
164. See Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkt. Ass’n [SIFMA], Global Advocacy Issues 8
(May 29, 2009) (discussion slides available at http://www.prmia.org/Chapter_Pages/
Data/Files/3226_3508_Global%20Advocacy%20Issues._other1.pdf); see also JOINT
RESPONSE BY HM TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA), AND THE
BANK OF ENGLAND TO THE COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON: A DRAFT
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Regulation captures the entirety of the global credit ratings
business because all ratings issued are available to all investors,
regardless of where they are based, and any institution that is
subject to EU regulation may decide to use its ratings for
regulatory purposes.165 The extraterritorial reach of the
regulation turns on whether a particular jurisdiction’s
regulatory regime is considered “at least as stringent” as the EU
CRA Regulation. CESR argues that there is no objective reason
to set different requirements for non-EU CRAs depending on the
mechanism used, so the quality requirements for credit ratings
endorsed and credit ratings issued by a certified CRA should not
be different.166 Thus, a decision by the European Commission
recognizing the equivalence of a third country’s legal and
supervisory framework would be sufficient for an endorsing EU
CRA to demonstrate that the non-EU CRA fulfils requirements
at least as stringent as those set out in the EU CRA
Regulation.167
In the past, equivalency focused more on whether the
regulatory regime broadly achieved equivalent outcomes. For
example, in 2008 the EU deemed the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles of the United States, Canada, and Japan
equivalent to its International Financial Reporting Standards,
despite some major differences.168 Due to the subprime
mortgage crisis, the EU may be in a position to assert regulatory
leadership, causing equivalency determinations for CRAs to be

DIRECTIVE/REGULATION ON THE AUTHORISATION, OPERATION AND SUPERVISION OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (CRAS) AND POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF
EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), http://circa.europa.eu/
Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/
authorities/uk_ministrypdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d [hereinafter HM TREASURY]; Letter from
Jonathan Taylor, Chairman, Int’l Council of Sec. Ass’ns [ICSA], & Marilyn Skiles,
Sec’y Gen., ICSA, to DG MARKT 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/
financial_services/credit_agencies/citizens/international_associatio/_EN_1.0_&a=d;
Letter from Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President, Standard and Poor’s
Ratings Servs., to DG MARKT 3 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/
credit_agencies/citizens/standard_poorspdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
165. See, e.g., Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 3,
11.
166. See CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶¶ 88, 90–91.
167. See id. ¶ 91.
168. See Council Directive 2008/961, Commission Decision of 12 December 2008
on the Use By Third Countries’ Issuers of Securities of Certain Third Country’s
National Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to
Prepare Their Consolidated Financial Statements, 2008 O.J. (L 340) 112 (EC).
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based on more detailed evaluations involving a line-by-line
comparison of rules and regulations. “The European
Commission service’s informal view communicated to CESR
clearly states their understanding that [the endorsement
provisions] should be interpreted as requiring local legal and
regulatory system[s] to impose requirements as stringent as
those found” in the EU CRA Regulation.169 Thus, the EU is
essentially hinging non-EU CRAs’ abilities to qualify for
endorsement or certification on the regulatory authorities
located in their home countries. If a non-EU regulator wishes to
allow CRAs domiciled within its jurisdiction the right to issue
ratings for use in the EU, but does not already have a
regulatory regime at least as stringent as the EU’s, it may have
to comply with the EU CRA Regulation, including entering into
cooperation agreements with EU regulators.170 Consequently,
non-EU regulators may be forced to abide by provisions they did
not adopt.171
The equivalency determination also raises practical
implementation questions about what happens if non-EU
regulators are unable to fulfill their obligations or choose not to
satisfy the necessary requirements.172 It seems unfair to bar the
use of credit ratings in the EU if they are issued by non-EU
CRAs who are otherwise in compliance with all provisions in the
EU CRA Regulation. However, the EU CRA Regulation does not
provide any exceptions for such a situation, reasoning that:
[T]hird-country CRAs need to be subject to supervision and possible
enforcement by the relevant authority of the third-country for
endorsement to be effective. . . . If the requirements for endorsement
could be established on a voluntary basis the risk of noncompliance by
the third-country CRA would be significantly higher.173

The EU CRA Regulation provides an eighteen month
transition period until June 7, 2011 for the endorsement
provisions.174 During that time, the endorsing CRA will confirm
to EU authorities that the non-EU CRA has met the

169. CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶ 93.
170. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 5. The EU CRA
Regulation does, however, provide for limited exceptions. Id. art. 5(4).
171. See supra text accompanying note 169.
172. See M. Madelain & N. Phipps, Moody’s Investor Services, Presentation to
the IOSCO Standing Committee: Regulation of CRAs: Global Perspective 6, 12–23
(July 15, 2009) (discussion slides on file with author).
173. CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶¶ 94–95.
174. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 41.
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requirements on a self-imposed basis if there was no equivalent
local regulatory regime.175 After that date, however, the CRAs
without an exemption and whose home regulatory regimes are
not deemed equivalent to or as stringent as the EU CRA
Regulation have to establish and register a subsidiary within
the European Community and conduct all rating activities for
use in the EU through that entity.176
The three largest CRAs (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) are
based in the United States, and no CRA based in the EU is a
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO)
in the United States.177 In the event that no CRA is exempted
and no regulatory regimes are deemed equivalent to, or at least
as stringent as the EU CRA Regulation, only those ratings
developed entirely within the EU would be eligible for
regulatory purposes.178 This could hinder the flow of capital
between Europe and non-EU jurisdictions, thus lessening
European investment opportunities.179 It could also impact the
ability of foreign governments or companies to raise capital in
the EU.180 Finally, if the EU-based CRAs choose not to, or are
unable to, rate securities outside of the EU, the EU financial
institutions would not be able to invest in non-EU debt
securities.181 Even if the smaller EU CRAs did rate debt outside
of the EU, their ratings may not be viewed as being of sufficient
quality, and their regulatory use by EU financial firms may
raise concerns among other market participants.182
The EU CRA Regulation’s certification requirement could
also have anti-competitive effects, serving as a barrier to entry
into the EU market.183 While many of the U.S. based CRAs have

175. CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶ 100.
176. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 5.
177. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Spotlight on Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating
Organizations
(“NRSROs”),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/
ratingagency.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
178. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 5.
179. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive
Officer, Rating and Investment Information, Inc., to Jörgen Holmquist, Dir. Gen.,
Internal Mkt. and Servs., European Comm’n 4 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/
credit_agencies/citizens/ri_japanpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
180. SIFMA, supra note 164, at 8.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. See generally Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra
note 179, at 4 (claiming that Article 3 could compel non-Community-based CRAs to
cease operations in the European Community); Letter from Takefumi Emori,
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subsidiaries in the EU, two of the largest CRAs in Asia, Rating
and Investment Information, Inc. and Japan Credit Rating
Agency, Ltd., do not currently have subsidiaries in the EU.184
Rating and Investment Information, Inc. primarily assigns
ratings on bonds issued in Japan, but it also assigns ratings to
bonds issued in the European Community’s markets, including
finance subsidiaries of Japanese corporations, EU sovereign
governments, and EU issuers.185 Similarly, Japan Credit Rating
Agency, Ltd. primarily rates corporations and financial
institutions in Japan, but those ratings can be utilized by
banking institutions in the EC for risk weight assessment.186
While the volume of rating activities each CRA performs in the
EU is relatively small, they are both large CRAs likely to be
deemed systemically important, and thus would not be able to
use the certification procedure.187 Instead, these CRAs would
have the burden of establishing EU-based subsidiaries to issue
these ratings.188 Such an action may be deemed too costly in
relation to the amount of revenue such rating activities would
generate, causing CRAs like Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.
or Rating and Investment Information, Inc. to withdraw from
the Community altogether.189 Even for entities not found to be
systemically important, many jurisdictions’ regulations likely
will not be deemed equivalent because the EU CRA Regulation
extends beyond the IOSCO Code of Conduct and ratings issued
by these unqualified CRAs would be disbarred, thereby limiting
competition within the EU.190
The European Commission is currently seeking technical

Managing Dir., Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., to the European Comm’n 2 (Sept.
5, 2008), available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/
library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/citizens/jcr_japanpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d
(noting that the requirement of having a subsidiary or branch in the Community
could prevent some non-Community-based CRAs from operating in the Community
completely).
184. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at
3; Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2.
185. Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 3.
186. Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2
(providing the example of EC banking institutions using the ratings for risk weight
assessment under Basel II).
187. See supra text accompanying note 140.
188. See supra text accompanying note 140.
189. See supra text accompanying note 140; see also Letter from Yasuhiro
Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 4.
190. See Edmund Parker & Miles Bake, Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in
Europe, 24 BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 401, 402 (2009).
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advice from CESR regarding whether the regulatory
frameworks in the United States, Japan, and Canada are
equivalent, as well as whether additional jurisdictions should be
assessed.191 The outcome of CESR’s investigation should provide
additional insight into the rigidity of the “equivalence”
requirement, and the extent to which the EU CRA Regulation
will have anti-competitive or extraterritorial effects.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The IOSCO Code of Conduct, the U.S. Rating Agency Act,
and the EU CRA Regulation all include provisions covering
conflicts of interest, but the specificity and scope of the
provisions vary greatly, creating another area of potential
conflict. The EU CRA Regulation provides detailed
requirements relating to the organizational structure and
corporate governance of CRAs as a way to avoid conflicts of
interest.192 For example, CRAs must establish administrative or
supervisory boards to ensure that credit rating activities are
independent, properly identify conflicts of interest, and
maintain
agency
compliance
with
the
regulation
requirements.193 At least one-third of the board’s members, but
no less than two members, must be independent and uninvolved
in credit rating activities.194 At least one of these independent
members and one other member of the board are required to
have “in-depth knowledge and experience at a senior level of the
markets in structured finance instruments” if the CRA issues
credit ratings of structured finance instruments.195 The
regulation also stipulates requirements regarding the
compensation, term length, dismissal, and financial expertise of
the independent members.196 Finally, the independent members
are given the task of monitoring, among other things, the

191. See Letter from Jörgen Holmquist, Dir. Gen., Internal Mkt. and Servs.,
European Comm’n, to Eddy Wymeersh, Chairman, CESR (June 12, 2009), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/cesr/cesr_mandat20090612_en.pdf.
192. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § A.
193. Id. annex I, § A(1).
194. Id. annex I, § A(2).
195. Id.
196. Id. The regulation requires independent members’ compensation to be
separate from the business performance of the CRA to ensure independence of their
judgment. Id. It also provides that independent members cannot serve more than a
five-year non-renewable term. Id. Dismissal of an independent board member is only
allowed in the case of misconduct or professional underperformance. Id.
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development of the methodologies used by the CRA and the
effectiveness of internal controls.197
Many CRAs expressed concern about the ability of the EU
to regulate their corporate governance standards, especially
given the fact that most CRAs are headquartered outside of the
EU and therefore subject to separate corporate governance
standards.198 For example, Moody’s is listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and therefore complies with NYSE’s
Corporate Governance Listing Standards, which differ from the
standards outlined in the EU CRA Regulation.199 Similarly,
under Japanese law, shareholders have the right to elect the
executive and non-executive members of the board of directors
at shareholder meetings.200 Japanese shareholders may find it
excessively intrusive, and a violation of their rights, to be forced
to limit the terms of office of the non-executive members of the
board in order to comply with the EU CRA Regulation.201 A.M.
Best, another U.S.-based rating agency, argued that it is under
no obligation to have independent board members as a privately
held company headquartered in the United States.202 The
extraterritorial reach of these provisions could be extreme if
they obligate non-EU CRAs to abandon their current corporate
governance arrangements, which comply with the laws in their
respective jurisdictions, and non-EU regulators are forced to
change their corporate governance standards in order for CRAs
based in their jurisdictions to be deemed equivalent in the EU.
It is also unclear how the requirement to have independent
members on an administrative or supervisory board would apply
within a group structure.203 Standard and Poor’s expressed
concern that a subsidiary will frequently not have any
197. Id. annex I, § A(2)(a), (b).
198. See Letter from Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s
Investors Serv., to Maria Valentza, Head of the Sec. Unit, DG MARKT 2–6 (Sept. 5,
2008), available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/
library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/citizens/moodyspdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d; see
also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 3;
Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 5; Letter from
Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 3.
199. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 3.
200. Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 3.
201. Id.
202. Letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Executive Vice President and Chief Rating
Officer, A.M. Best Co., to European Comm’n 3 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/
credit_agencies/citizens/am_bestpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
203. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 19.
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independent board members, but the regulation does not clarify
if the board of the parent company in those circumstances is to
be treated as the administrative or supervisory board or if both
the parent and the subsidiary will be required to appoint nonexecutive directors.204 This requirement places particular
pressure on systemically important CRAs because they must
establish subsidiaries in the EU to endorse the ratings of their
non-EU based affiliates.205 This means they could potentially
have more than one administrative or supervisory board with
each required to comply with the corporate governance
standards outlined in the EU CRA Regulation.206
The independent board member requirements also raise a
number of other concerns. First, they could have “the
unintended consequence of inhibiting credit rating agent
competition in the EU.”207 Additionally, the regulations
“inappropriately weight the knowledge base of CRA’s nonexecutive board members toward the structured finance
industry.”208 Requiring the independent members to monitor the
methodologies, quality control systems, and compliance
processes used by the CRA could make it hard for CRAs to find
and retain independent board members since most nonexecutive directors would be reluctant to assume such
responsibility.209 Assigning these obligations to independent
board members may even erode their objectivity and
independence by implicating them in day-to-day decision
making.210 The extensive regulation of independent board
204. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying note 140.
206. See supra text accompanying note 140.
207. Letter from Larry G. Mayewski to European Comm’n, supra note 202, at 3.
208. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 5.
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id. at 4. “[N]on-executive or independent directors are seen as being
valuable precisely because they will bring a different perspective to the deliberations
of the Board. It is generally the role of non-executive or independent directors ‘to
exercise objective independent judgment on corporate affairs.’” Letter from Vickie A.
Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 18–19 (citing Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 63
(2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf). “Therefore,
the expectation, in many jurisdictions at least, is that the non-executives’ role is not
to act as experts in order to monitor the work of the executives, officers, and
employees of the group . . . .” Id. at 19. It seems imprudent to require such a central
monitoring function to be handed over to independent members “with no long-term
stake in the reputation of the CRA.” Letter from Stephen W. Joynt, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Fitch Ratings, to DG MARKT 6 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/
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members is a significant change from the self-regulatory regime
under which CRAs previously operated, and is considerably
more prescriptive than the IOSCO Code of Conduct and the U.S.
Rating Agency Act.211
The EU CRA Regulation also contains specific provisions
aimed at rating analysts that are inconsistent with the IOSCO
Code of Conduct and the U.S. Rating Agency Act. The regulation
requires CRAs to establish gradual rotation mechanisms so that
rating analysts cannot be involved in rating activities related to
the same entity or its related third parties for more than five
years.212 This could negatively impact the quality of ratings and
will be extremely costly and burdensome to implement.213 The
quality of ratings in smaller, more concentrated sectors, such as
structured finance securities, is especially at risk as the
requirement limits analyst and committee experience by forcing
board members to rotate.214
This rule is aimed at concerns that the excessive familiarity
of an analyst and a rated enterprise creates conflicts of interest
that could influence the credit ratings issued.215 However, credit
rating decisions are made by ratings committees, not single
analysts, and these ratings committees consist of analysts from
different teams and different sectors.216 Thus, it is arguably

Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/
citizens/fitchpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
211. Neither the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct or the U.S. Rating Agency Act
contain any provisions relating to the corporate governance of CRAs.
212. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 7(4); see also id. annex I,
§ C(8). Lead analysts must rotate every four years and approvers must rotate every
seven years. Id.
213. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 21–
22 (stating that Moody’s might have to recruit solely in order to be able to rotate
analysts); see also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note
183, at 2; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 18; Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG
MARKT, supra note 164, at 34.
214. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, REPORT OF THE CEPS-ECMI
JOINT WORKSHOP ON “THE REFORM OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES” 3 (2008),
http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/files/Report_CRAMeeting_19Nov08%20FinalII.pdf;
see also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2
(stating that the requirement will likely impede the analysts’ progress in gaining
knowledge and expertise about a particular business sector because some business
sectors are comprised of only a few unaffiliated enterprises); HM TREASURY, supra
note 164, at 18; Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 34.
215. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183,
at 2–3.
216. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 21;
see also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2.
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unnecessary to rotate analysts.217 Rather than mitigating
potential conflicts of interest, the effect of requiring analyst
rotation could be decreased competition if small or mediumsized CRAs are unable to comply with this provision.218
The EU CRA Regulation also places employment
restrictions on analysts, prohibiting any rating analyst or
employee of a CRA from taking a key management position with
an entity he or she rated, or its related third party, within six
months of the credit rating.219 “Key management position” is not
defined in the regulation, making it unclear exactly what
positions analysts would be barred from taking.220 CRAs based
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan all
expressed concerns about the legality and enforceability of this
employment restriction in their respective jurisdictions.221
Furthermore, this requirement could make it difficult for CRAs
to compete for talented people who may prefer to work for an
employer that does not restrict their career advancement
opportunities.222 Finally, the employment restriction provision,
like the analyst rotation requirement, misunderstands the role
of individuals in the rating process; an individual cannot make
or break ratings for particular entities which they may later
join.223
Under the EU CRA Regulation, credit rating agencies are
additionally tasked with ensuring that its rating analysts and
other employees directly involved in credit rating activities have
“appropriate knowledge and experience for the duties
assigned.”224 This contrasts with the revised IOSCO Code of
217. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183,
at 2; see also Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at
10 (stating that the same goal can be achieved with rating committees where
analysts in charge of the rated entity do not have voting rights at the rating
committee).
218. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at
10 (stating that it may be impossible for some smaller CRAs to comply with this due
to limited management resources); Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European
Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2 (arguing that the provision creates a competitive
disadvantage for small to medium-sized CRAs).
219. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § C(7).
220. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 41.
221. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at
18; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 23; Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria
Valentza, supra note 198, at 5.
222. Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 10;
see also Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 41.
223. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 42.
224. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 7(1).
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Conduct, which requires CRAs to “use people who, individually
or collectively (particularly where rating committees are used)
have appropriate knowledge and experience.”225 While there is
only a slight difference between the two provisions, the missing
phrase “or collectively” in the EU CRA Regulation could provide
regulators a platform from which to question the opinions of
individual analysts.226
In another attempt to reduce conflicts of interest, the EU
CRA Regulation prohibits CRAs from providing “consultancy or
advisory services to the rated entity or a related third party
regarding the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or
activities of that rated entity or related third party.”227 The
regulation, however, does not explicitly prohibit ancillary
services such as market forecasts, estimates of economic trends,
and pricing analysis so long as providing these ancillary services
does not create conflicts of interest.228 These provisions are
similar to those in the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct which
suggests CRAs should separate credit rating business from
other business of the agency, including consulting.229 While
these requirements may decrease potential conflicts of interest,
there are no similar requirements for consultancy or advisory
services in the U.S. Rating Agency Act. 230
Despite these differences, there are some similarities
between the three regulations. Most importantly, rating
analysts or approvers are prohibited from making proposals or
recommendations regarding the design of structured finance
instruments on which the CRA is expected to issue a credit
rating.231 The impact this regulation will have on CRAs remains
to be seen, but it is likely to have a significant effect on the
iterative process arrangers and CRAs typically employ, and it
will likely make arrangers’ tasks more difficult if they cannot
receive recommendations as to what changes are necessary to
achieve a particular rating.232 The Securities Industry and
225. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.4.
226. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 19.
227. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § B(4).
228. Id. annex I, § B(4).
229. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.5.
230. See generally Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109291, § 4, 120 Stat. 1327 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)).
231. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § B(5), with
SEC NRSRO Conflicts of Interest Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(5) (2009) (effective
Feb. 1, 2010), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.14-1.
232. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, THE EU RATING AGENCY REGULATION 5
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Financial Markets Association task force noted that it believes
the iterative process is a core service, not an advisory function,
and therefore would not be included within these provisions.233
All three regulations contain general provisions requiring
CRAs to eliminate, manage, and disclose any conflicts of interest
of employees.234 Each regulation specifically prohibits analysts
or approvers from participating in fee negotiations with the
rated entity,235 from receiving money, gifts, or favors from
anyone which the CRA does business with,236 and from owning
financial instruments of the rated entity, a related entity, or an
entity with which they have a business relationship.237 Finally,
the regulations require that the CRAs designate a compliance
officer to ensure compliance with the CRA’s policies and
procedures.238 While these provisions are relatively the same
(2009),
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/fileServer.aspx?fName=065cb65e-0cd7-4915819b-39584771aa53.pdf.
233. Id.
234. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § B(1),
(requiring CRAs to “identify, eliminate or manage and disclose . . . conflicts of
interest” but not requiring written protocols for such measures), with 17 C.F.R. §
240.17g-5(a) (prohibiting conflicts of interests unless the CRA discloses such conflict
and is “enforcing written policies and procedures to address and manage conflicts of
interest”), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.6 (advising
CRA’s to “adopt written internal procedures and mechanisms to (1) identify, and (2)
eliminate, or manage and disclose” conflicts of interest).
235. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 7(2), (specifying
the scope of the prohibited entity to include “any person directly or indirectly linked
to the rated entity by control”), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(6) (prohibiting analysts
from participating in negotiations, discussions, or arrangements of fee-payments in
general), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.12 (prohibiting
analysts from involvement in fee-arrangements with entities they rate).
236. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16 annex I, § C(4)
(prohibiting analysts from receiving any gifts, money, or favors with anyone doing
business with the CRA), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(7) (prohibiting analysts from
receiving gifts or entertainment from someone associated with the rated entity, over
an aggregate value of twenty-five dollars), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT,
supra note 71, § 2.15 (prohibiting analysts from receiving gifts or cash “exceeding a
minimal monetary value” from anyone doing business with the CRA).
237. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(2) (prohibiting analysts from having
direct ownership in the securities or other interests of the rated entity), with Council
Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § C(2)(a)–(c) (prohibiting interest in
rated entities which may cause a general perception of a conflict of interest), and
IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.13(a)–(e) (recommending
that analysts with any relationship to the rated entity not participate in the rating).
238. Compare Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j) (2006)
(requiring CRAs to designate a conflicts of interest compliance officer without
specifying compensation restrictions), with Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra
note 16, annex I, § A(5)–(7) (requiring a separate compensation structure for
compliance officers to ensure independent judgments), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE
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between the EU CRA Regulation, the revised IOSCO Code of
Conduct, and the U.S. Rating Agency Act, there are slight
nuances in many of the rules that could create a logistical
nightmare for CRAs determining what conflicts of interest
requirements to implement and enforce.239
C. METHODOLOGIES AND QUALITY OF CREDIT RATINGS
While all three regulatory regimes address the procedures
and methodologies CRAs use to formulate credit ratings, only
the EU CRA Regulation offers explicit details. The U.S. Rating
Agency Act prohibits U.S. regulators at either the state or
federal level from “regulat[ing] the substance of credit ratings or
the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally
recognized statistical rating organization determines credit
ratings.”240 As a result, other than a few disclosure
requirements necessary for CRAs to register as NRSROs,241 the
U.S. rules and regulations governing NRSROs provide no
requirements related to methodologies or rating procedures. The
EU CRA Regulation does not contain a similar prohibition in
the primary text of the regulation, but the recitals do state that
the competent authorities and member states should not
interfere in “relation to the substance of credit ratings and the
methodologies by which a credit rating agency determines credit
ratings.”242 Many CRAs have expressed concern, however, that
this is insufficient to protect their independence.243 The CRAs’
fear of intrusion in the content of their rating opinions from EU
regulators stems from two factors. First, the provisions in the
EU CRA Regulation are broad enough to give regulators a wide
range to interfere with the quality of ratings and methodologies,
the information used to support ratings, and the judgment and

OF CONDUCT,

supra note 71, § 1.15.
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120
Stat. 1327 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)).
241. See id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)).
242. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, para. 58.
243. See Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at
2 (recognizing that CRAs must have independence in formulating the content of
their ratings); Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at i
(arguing for regulatory flexibility so as to allow CRAs the freedom to develop
methodologies and policies); Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra
note 164, at 4 (stating that various regulatory provisions are too burdensome to
ensure independent and objective ratings).
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experience of CRA analysts and personnel.244 Second,
governments are the largest issuers of debt globally which could
heighten sensitivities to potential ratings actions.245 As a result,
EU regulators could feel pressured into preventing CRAs from
taking certain rating actions.246 This particular concern is
heightened by the fact that the EU CRA Regulation allows for
regulators of the home member states to impose sanctions on
CRAs.247 Therefore, the manner in which a CRA can implement
its methodologies and assess the quality of credit ratings is
critical to ensuring CRA independence.
The EU CRA Regulation directs CRAs to only use
“methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, continuous and
subject to validation based on historical experience, including
back-testing.”248 Comparatively, the IOSCO Code of Conduct
recommends that, where possible, ratings methods should be
subject to some form of objective validation based on historical
experience.249 The EU CRA Regulation thus creates a
requirement that CRAs validate their methodologies based on
historical experience, rather than following the recommendation
in the IOSCO Code of Conduct. This could result in CRAs being
discouraged from developing new methods.250 The EU CRA
Regulation also inserts the additional requirement that the
methodologies be “continuous,” a description not included in the
IOSCO Code of Conduct.251 CRAs often use both quantitative
and qualitative inputs in rating decisions, with analysts
evaluating the relative importance of different inputs, and it is
unclear if these are considered “continuous” or “systematic.”252
Moreover, this provision could justify regulatory interference in
the methods, models, and independent rating decisions of CRAs
244. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 4.
245. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 1.
246. Id.
247. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 24(1)(a)–(c), (f) (allowing
regulators to withdraw the registration of a CRA, temporarily prohibit a CRA from
issuing a credit rating, prevent the Community from using the CRA’s credit rating,
or refer matters for criminal prosecution).
248. Id. art. 8(3).
249. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.2.
250. See Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at
8 (arguing in opposition to article 12(4) of the Commission’s proposed regulation
(now article 8(3) of the current regulation) by stating that a standard regulatory
review of rating methodologies is not suited to serve the development of new
criteria).
251. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(3).
252. See HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 18.
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because it is not clear that independent judgment is
protected.253
With regard to the methodologies used in relation to
structured finance products, the EU CRA Regulation provides:
In a case where the lack of reliable data or the complexity of the
structure of a new type of financial instrument or the quality of
information available is not satisfactory or raises serious questions as
to whether a credit rating agency can provide a credible credit rating,
the credit rating agency shall refrain from issuing a credit rating or
withdraw an existing rating.254

The revised IOSCO Code of Conduct contains similar language,
but only recommends that the CRA should update ratings when
it is reasonable to do so; it does not mandate that the CRA
necessarily withdraw a rating.255 Whether the methodology of a
particular credit rating meets the criteria of the EU CRA
Regulation is a matter of interpretation and opinion.256 This
provision raises concerns that CRAs will be deterred from
expressing views on more complex structures, which would not
increase transparency. This provision is also potentially
contrary to the best interest of the market as it is likely that
investors value the opinion of an independent and experienced
third party when they are making investment decisions for
complex products.257 If CRAs are prevented from publishing
ratings in these circumstances, it may inhibit the movement of
information in the markets and weaken investor confidence.258
Most importantly, this provision appears to intrude on CRA
independence, in direct violation of the U.S. Rating Agency Act’s
prohibition of regulating the substance, procedures, or
methodologies used by CRAs. Constraining CRA independence
in this way could even impair the credibility of the European
capital market and disadvantage European issuers and
investors in relation to their international counterparts, thereby

253. Id.
254. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § D I(4) (emphasis
added).
255. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.9(c).
256. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, para. 4.5(e).
257. Id. para. 5.6; see also Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza,
supra note 198, at 2 (stating that CRAs may be prevented from publishing
unpopular but candid and objective commentary on structured finance instruments
when many investors value credit ratings precisely because they are independent,
objective, and for the benefit of the market rather than any individual).
258. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 2.
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raising the cost of capital.259
The EU CRA Regulation additionally requires that the
CRAs “adopt, implement and enforce adequate measures to
ensure that the credit ratings it issues are based on a thorough
analysis of all the information that is available to it” and also
“adopt all necessary measures so that the information it uses in
assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from reliable
sources.”260 The IOSCO Code of Conduct, on the other hand,
only suggests that CRAs adopt “reasonable measures so that the
information it uses in assigning a rating is of sufficient quality
to support a credible rating.”261 The EU CRA Regulation is
viewed by CRAs as creating an unprecedented affirmative duty
to conduct due diligence on all underlying information used in
ratings.262 This raises several concerns. First, if the EU
interprets these verification regulations as making CRAs liable
for the quality of the due diligence performed, it exposes the
CRAs to legal liability.263 Second, this could lead to greater
reliance on credit ratings, contrary to the goal of the European
Commission.264 Third, there may be instances when conducting
due diligence is not possible because it is prohibited by law, the
information is unavailable for review, or there is such a large
volume of information that it would be unworkable.265 Given the
hundreds of thousands of ratings some CRAs assign globally,
obligating a CRA to verify all underlying information used in a
rating would be overly burdensome and could potentially bring
operations to a halt.266 Finally, this requirement is inconsistent
with the fundamental role CRAs play in the financial
markets.267
The EU CRA Regulation also requires CRAs to review their
credit ratings and methodologies at least annually.268 The
revised IOSCO Code of Conduct, on the other hand, only states
that CRAs should establish a review function responsible for
periodically reviewing the methodologies in such a manner that
259. Id.
260. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(2).
261. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.7.
262. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 7.
263. See, e.g., Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164,
para. 9.2.
264. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 20.
265. Id. at 7 n.19.
266. Id. at 19–20.
267. Letter from Larry G. Mayewski to European Comm’n, supra note 202, at 6.
268. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(5).
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is “consistent with the applicable rating methodology.”269
Requiring CRAs to review their methods annually encourages a
one-size-fits-all depth of review that could result in wasting
resources on reviews of uncontroversial methods which already
produce a stable rating performance.270 This also raises a
concern about the U.S. Rating Agency Act’s prohibition on
regulating the procedures or methodologies used in determining
ratings.271
Additionally, the EU CRA Regulation requires that when a
methodology, model, or key rating assumption changes, the CRA
must immediately disclose the change and the likely scope of the
credit ratings affected, review the affected credit ratings within
six months of the change, and re-rate all ratings affected by the
changed methodologies.272 The IOSCO Code of Conduct only
recommends that CRAs publicly disclose material modifications
to its methodologies, and does not contain any provisions
suggesting that CRAs review and re-rate previously issued
credit ratings.273 Because CRAs must review all affected credit
ratings within a fixed time of six months after the change, this
could significantly deter CRAs from undertaking major
alterations to methodologies if it is unclear that the review can
be completed within the allotted time frame.274 Furthermore,
requiring CRAs to disclose the scope of credit ratings likely to be
implicated could generate market volatility. If a CRA is required
to indicate the potential direction of a rating immediately
following a methodological change without having yet done a
thorough analysis and review, the market could overreact.275

269. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.9(b).
270. Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 8
(responding to article 12(4) of the Commission’s proposed regulations (now article
8(5) of the current regulation)); see also Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria
Valentza, supra note 198, at 23 (arguing that codifying a timeline would be
inappropriate since it may be necessary to conduct more or less frequent reviews).
271. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, ¶ 10.1
(encouraging the Commission to align its regulations with the SEC Rules concerning
the practice of CRAs relying on existing ratings from other CRAs).
272. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(6).
273. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 3.10.
274. Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 8–9
(responding to article 12(5) of the Commission’s proposed regulations (now article
8(6) of the current regulation)).
275. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 22; see
also HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 20 (arguing that an enforced re-rating of
securities that are meeting original expectations could send out misleading
messages and create unnecessary costs in the market).
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D. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY
Both the U.S. and EU regulations contain detailed
provisions pertaining to disclosure and transparency, but the
disclosures required by the EU CRA Regulation are more farreaching than those required by the U.S. Rating Agency Act.
Both require, among other things, the disclosure of conflicts of
interest,276 organizational structure,277 codes of conduct,278 a list
of the largest twenty clients by revenue,279 and
methodologies.280 The EU CRA Regulation additionally requires
disclosure
of
the
general
nature
of
compensation
arrangements,281 material modifications made to systems,
resources and procedures,282 a list of all ancillary services
provided by the CRA,283 as well as disclosure of various
policies.284 While perhaps burdensome, these added disclosures
do not create any specific hurdles for CRAs, considering the
revised IOSCO Code of Conduct already recommends CRAs
make many of these disclosures,285 and the U.S. regulation
requires CRAs to maintain records pertaining to many of these
276. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(1),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(vi) (2006).
277. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(III)(1),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2006).
278. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(7),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(v) (2006).
279. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, §
E(II)(2)(a) (requiring such information be made public), with 15 U.S.C. § 78o7(a)(1)(B)(viii) (2006) (allowing such information to be kept confidential). The EU
CRA Regulation also requires CRAs disclose a list of clients
[w]hose contribution to the growth rate in the generation of revenue of the
credit rating agency in the previous financial year exceeded the growth
rate in the total revenues of the credit rating agency in that year by a
factor of more than 1.5 times. Any such client shall be included on the list
only where, in that year, it accounted for more than 0.25% of the worldwide
total revenues of the credit rating agency at global level.
Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(II)(2)(b).
280. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(5),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
281. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(4).
282. Id. annex I, § E(I)(6).
283. Id. annex I, § E(I)(2).
284. See id. annex I, § E(I)(3) (requiring disclosure of the policy concerning
publication of credit ratings); id. annex I, § E(III)(4) (requiring disclosure of the
record-keeping policy); id. annex I, § E(III)(6) (requiring disclosure of the
management and rating analyst rotation policy).
285. See IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.8 (compensation
arrangements); id. § 3.3 (rating presentation policy); id. § 3.9 (unsolicited rating
policy); id. § 3.10 (material modifications).
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items.286
In addition to the disclosure of methodologies required by
both the U.S. and EU regulations, the EU CRA Regulation
requires CRAs to publicly disclose “descriptions of models and
key rating assumptions such as mathematical or correlation
assumptions used in its credit rating activities.”287 Moody’s
raised concerns that this places too much weight on models and
could lead users of ratings to discount the significance of
qualitative factors, mistakenly treat credit opinions as
statements of fact, or view deviations from models as evidence of
a CRA’s failure to follow procedure.288 Moreover, rating analysts
and ratings committees might be discouraged from exercising
their independent judgment, which could in turn negatively
affect the quality and usefulness of credit ratings altogether.289
The EU and U.S. regulations also differ on the extent to
which CRAs must disclose credit ratings. The EU CRA
Regulation requires CRAs to “disclose any credit rating, as well
as any decision to discontinue a credit rating, on a non-selective
basis and in a timely manner,” including credit ratings that are
distributed by subscription.290 The U.S. only requires CRAs to
make all credit ratings available either twelve or twenty-four
months after the rating action is taken,291 with a random
sample of 10% of the outstanding issuer-paid credit ratings for
each class of credit ratings for which it has issued 500 or more
outstanding credit ratings made publicly available six months
after the rating action is taken.292
The SEC believes that this amount of disclosure is sufficient
because it should result in a substantial amount of new
information and allow market observers to analyze the
286. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(a) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010) (requiring,
among other things, that CRAs maintain records on the identity of any credit
analyst(s) that participated in determining the rating, the identity of the person that
approved the rating, any rationale for a material difference between the rating
implied by the model and the final rating issued, whether a rating was solicited or
unsolicited, a list of the general types of services and products offered, and
compliance reports).
287. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(5).
288. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 26.
289. Id.
290. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 10(1).
291. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-2(d)(3)(i)(B), (C) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010)
(requiring disclosure of all obligor paid ratings twelve months after rating release
and disclosure of non-obligor paid ratings twenty-four months after rating release).
292. Id. § 240.17g-2(d)(2) (requiring information to be made publicly available on
the CRAs’ websites).
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information and develop performance metrics.293 The EU CRA
Regulation’s complete public disclosure requirement of all credit
ratings, both issuer and subscriber paid, could reduce
competition and have an adverse impact on CRAs that make
money from selling ratings.294 Instead, the SEC argues that the
level of disclosure called for in the U.S. regulations will likely
enhance competition by making it easier for smaller CRAs to
establish a proven track record of determining accurate
ratings.295
In an attempt to make the rating process more transparent,
the EU CRA Regulation requires CRAs to make historical
performance data available in a central repository established
by CESR.296 This data is required for all credit ratings “(i)
issued or endorsed by credit rating agencies registered in the
Community, or (ii) issued by any certified credit rating agency
which are disclosed publicly or distributed by subscription,” but
preferably for all credit ratings issued globally.297 CESR
requested that CRAs submit historical rating performance data
covering at least the previous ten years before the regulation
took force.298 Many CRAs have objected to free access to
historical data because such information is currently available
only to paid subscribers.299 CESR, however, has yet to put any
293. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6460 (Feb. 9,
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b).
294. Id. at 6461.
295. Id. at 22.
296. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 11(2) (requiring
disclosure of historical performance data “including the ratings transition frequency
and information about credit ratings issued in the past and on their changes”). The
CRAs can supply CESR with raw data and CESR will compile the performance
statistics itself. CESR, Feedback Statement: CESR’s Consultation on CRAs Central
Repository, ¶ 9, CESR/09-822a, (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/
popup2.php?id=6143 [hereinafter CESR, Feedback Statement].
297. CESR, Feedback Statement, supra note 296, ¶ 11. Reporting must be
consistent across all asset classes and an explanation is required if a non-global
approach is taken. Id. ¶ 15.
298. See CESR, Consultation Document: CRAs Central Repository, ¶ 66,
CESR/09-579,
(July
9,
2009),
available
at
http://www.cesr-eu.org/
popup2.php?id=5795 [hereinafter CESR, Consultation Document]. Both Moody’s and
S&P are unclear about the time frame for historic data desired by CESR. See Letter
from Federic Drevon, Senior Managing Dir., Moody’s Investors Serv., to Comm. of
Sec. Regulators, 8 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/
popup_responses.php?id=4783; Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, Response Dated
7 August 2009 to CESR Consultation Paper on CRA Central Repository, 3 (Aug. 7,
2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup_responses.php?id=4787.
299. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 37
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measures in place to address those concerns.300
The EU CRA Regulation also contains substantial
disclosure requirements pertaining to the presentation of
ratings.301 CRAs are required to state the names and titles of
the lead rating analysts and primary person responsible for
approving the rating,302 to indicate the material sources which
were used to prepare the credit rating,303 to state the
methodology used to determine the rating,304 to provide
appropriate risk warnings, and to state any attributes and
limitations of the rating.305 The extensive presentation
requirements are extremely burdensome on CRAs because each
rating reflects opinions based on large amounts of information
from numerous sources,306 all of which would need to be
disclosed in order to provide a complete understanding of the
rating. Furthermore, the regulation is vague, failing to provide
any guidance on what is meant by phrases like “sensitivity
analysis of the relevant assumptions.”307 These provisions seem
aimed at curtailing investors’ excessive reliance on credit
ratings by helping them understand the risks associated with
the rated product or entity, but unless investors recognize that
ratings only reflect credit risk, even these detailed disclosure
requirements will do nothing to stop over-reliance on ratings.308
Finally, CRAs are required by the EU CRA Regulation to
file an annual transparency report which includes a description
of the internal control mechanisms, statistics on the allocation
of staff, a description of its record-keeping policy, and the
outcome of an annual internal review of the independence
compliance function.309 This essentially creates an entirely new
disclosure system that is inconsistent with existing global norms
(raising additional concerns that third parties could reformat the data and present it
as their own); see also Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra
note 210, at 9; Letter from Larry G. Mayewski to European Comm’n, supra note 202,
at 4.
300. See generally CESR, Consultation Document, supra note 298.
301. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 10; id. annex I, § D.
302. Id. annex I, § D(I)(1).
303. Id. annex I, § D(I)(2)(a).
304. Id. annex I, § D(I)(2)(b).
305. Id. annex I, § D(I)(4) (requiring CRAs to disclose whether it considers the
information available on the rated entity satisfactory and to what extent the CRA
has verified information provided to it by the rated entity).
306. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 42.
307. Id.
308. See HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 14.
309. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 12, annex I, § E(III).
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and standards.310 Moody’s expressed specific concern that the
disclosure requirements could have a chilling effect on internal
compliance and discourage potential whistleblowers from
reporting concerns.311 Despite these and other concerns, CESR
has yet to issue any guidance as to how the transparency report
requirements will be interpreted.
E. STRUCTURED FINANCE INSTRUMENTS
Regulators reacted to the heavy criticism of CRAs’ ratings
of structured finance instruments by enacting specific provisions
aimed directly at solving the problems brought to light by the
subprime mortgage crisis.312 Unlike traditional corporate bond
ratings, credit ratings of structured finance products are often
viewed as seals of approval, which raises regulatory concerns
given that CRAs generally do not confirm the validity of the
underlying data provided to them.313 The EU CRA Regulation
addresses this by requiring CRAs to “state what level of
assessment it has performed concerning the due diligence
processes carried out at the level of underlying financial
instruments or other assets of structured finance
instruments.”314
The EU CRA Regulation also requires CRAs to explain the
“assumptions, parameters, limits and uncertainties surrounding
the models and rating methodologies used in [structured
finance] credit ratings, including simulations of stress scenarios
undertaken by the agencies when establishing the ratings.”315
The revised IOSCO Code of Conduct contains a similar
provision, asking a CRA to “disclose the degree to which it
analyzes how sensitive a rating of a structured finance product
is to changes in the CRA’s underlying rating assumptions.”316
Additionally, both the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct and the
EU CRA Regulation contain provisions requiring CRAs to

310. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 28.
311. Id.
312. See generally FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 68 (providing
recommendations such as implementing the Basel II capital framework); IOSCO,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 70 (recommending a Code of Conduct focused on
maintaining the quality of the ratings process, the independence of rating agencies,
and CRAs’ responsibilities to the investing public).
313. IOSCO, FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 8.
314. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § D(II)(2).
315. Id. annex I, § D(II)(3).
316. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 3.5(a).
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provide information about the loss and cash flow analysis it has
performed or upon which it is relying.317 These provisions are
aimed at addressing regulators’ concerns about a lack of
independent means by which institutional investors can assess
the risk of the securities.318
The revised IOSCO Code of Conduct, EU CRA Regulation,
and recent amendments to the rules promulgated pursuant to
the U.S. Rating Agency Act all contain provisions aimed at
promoting unsolicited ratings of structured finance products,
thereby reducing “rating shopping.”319 The EU addresses this
problem by requiring CRAs to disclose information about all
structured finance products submitted for initial review or
preliminary rating, regardless of whether issuers contract with
the CRA for a final rating.320 The revised IOSCO Code of
Conduct and the U.S. rules take a slightly different approach by
requiring structured finance issuers to publicly disclose all
information provided to the CRAs for use in determining the
credit rating,321 an approach supported by the CRAs.322
The U.S. regulation addresses the problem of rating
shopping by first making it a conflict of interest for a CRA to
provide a rating of any structured finance instrument paid for
by the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter.323 A CRA is then
prohibited from having a conflict of interest unless certain
requirements are met. First, the CRA must maintain a
password-protected website listing every structured finance
instrument for which the CRA is currently in the process of
determining an initial credit rating.324 Next, the CRA must
provide other CRAs with unlimited access to this passwordprotected website so long as the CRAs meet certain certification
317. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § D(II)(1); IOSCO,
REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 3.5(a).
318. See IOSCO, FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 9.
319. Rating shopping refers to CRAs being pressured into providing favorable
ratings by asking different CRAs to provide prospective assessments of structured
finance instruments before deciding which CRA to hire. See id. at 14.
320. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex 1 § D(II)(4).
321. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(3) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010); IOSCO,
REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.8(c).
322. See, e.g., Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198,
at 30.
323. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(9) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010).
324. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(i). This list must be in chronological order and must
identify the type of structured finance instrument, provide the name of the issuer,
provide the date the rating process was initiated, and provide the website address
where the issuer will disclose its required information. Id.

2010]

Exporting EU REGULATIONS ON CRAS

445

requirements.325 The hired CRA must then obtain a
representation from the arranger of the structured finance
instrument that the arranger will contemporaneously post on its
own password-protected website for all certified CRAs to
access326 all the information it provides the hired CRA for
purposes of determining the initial credit rating327 or for
purposes of undertaking credit rating surveillance.328 This
includes information about the characteristics of the underlying
assets, the legal structure of the instrument, and the
performance of the assets.329 The hired CRA is provided some
safe harbor if the arranger fails to comply with its disclosure
requirements so long as the CRA reasonably relied on the
arranger’s representation, taking into consideration factors such
as prior failures by the arranger to adhere to its
representations.330
By requiring arrangers to make all the information given to
retained CRAs available to all other CRAs, the U.S. regulation
will improve the quality of credit ratings for structured finance
products by making it possible for more CRAs to rate these
instruments.331 The dissemination of these unsolicited ratings
should then make it more difficult for arrangers to engage in
rating shopping because the market will reveal ratings issued
higher than warranted.332 At the same time, the requirements
are not excessively burdensome on CRAs as they are only
required to maintain minimal information on pending deals.333
The only significant difference between the EU and U.S.
regulations as they pertain to ratings of structured finance
instruments is in the use of rating symbols. The EU CRA

325. See Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii). In order to be certified the CRA must state,
among other things, that the CRA will determine and maintain ratings for at least
10% of the structured finance instruments for which it accesses information if it
accesses information for ten or more issued securities in the calendar year covered
by the certification. See id. § 240.17g-5(e).
326. See id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(B).
327. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(C).
328. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(D).
329. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(C), (D).
330. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,847
(Dec. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b).
331. See id. at 63,851.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 63,854 (arguing that adding a portal for other CRAs to access
pending deal information is not expected to require significant costs as all CRAs
currently maintain websites with password-protected portals).
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Regulation requires CRAs to differentiate credit ratings for
structured finance instruments from traditional corporate debt
instruments by using an additional symbol.334 Many CRAs
objected to this requirement for various reasons.335 First, the
rule directly contradicts strong investor sentiment, with over
75% of investors surveyed by Moody’s strongly advising against
changing the rating scale currently used.336 Many investors also
expressed the view that simply adding a modifier for structured
finance ratings would be a purely cosmetic change.337 Moreover,
CRAs disapprove of the requirement because of the significant
market costs involved in implementing changes in the rating
symbols.338 From a practical perspective, there is no universally
accepted definition of the term “structured finance,” making it
difficult for CRAs to determine exactly which instruments
require the additional symbol.339 It is also unlikely that the
added
symbol
will
adequately
address
investor’s
misunderstandings about the risks associated with these
products.340 Finally, and most importantly, the EU CRA
Regulation creates significant international divergence in an
area which had previously been consistent worldwide.
F. OVERARCHING IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU CRA REGULATION
While individually every requirement in the EU CRA
Regulation appears to be reasonable and have a positive effect
on the quality of ratings issued by CRAs, taken as a whole the
requirements are over-burdensome, anti-competitive, and
effectively export the EU’s regulatory regime to any country
which headquarters a CRA wishing to issue ratings for use in

334. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 10(3).
335. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183,
at 3; Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 9;
Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 6–7.
336. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 24
(surveying over 200 institutions representing over $9 trillion in fixed income assets
under management).
337. See id.; Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note
210, at 9.
338. See HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 13; Letter from Michel Madelain to
Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 24.
339. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 24
(arguing that covered bonds, hybrid debt securities, trust preferred securities,
warrants, and convertible bonds could be construed as forms of structured financing
and fall within the requirement).
340. See id.; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 21.
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the EU. The EU CRA Regulation essentially ignores the fact
that most CRAs are headquartered outside of the EU and
therefore subject to various laws and regulations in their home
country which do not conform to the detailed standards
promulgated by the European Commission.341
The extent of the extraterritorial and anti-competitive
effects of the EU CRA Regulation turn on a few issues which
have yet to be resolved. First, what does “systemically
important” mean?342 If this term is defined too broadly, some of
the affected CRAs may decline to establish a subsidiary within
the EU as required by the endorsement provisions343 due to the
large costs associated with such a venture.344 Second, what will
happen if a credit rating agency or non-EU regulator cannot
fulfill its obligations under the EU CRA Regulation because it is
illegal in its host country? For example, many CRAs expressed
concern that the corporate governance requirements intruded on
shareholder rights or established standards in their home
country, and it is thus likely that they could not comply with
many of the EU’s requirements without violating a separate
law.345 It seems unlikely that a non-EU regulator would alter its
shareholder rights laws simply so that a few CRAs could comply
with the EU CRA Regulation. Similar concerns were also raised
in the context of the employment restrictions placed on
analysts.346

341. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 3.
342. The Financial Stability Board has issued a report providing guidance for
national authorities on how to assess the systemic importance of financial
institutions, markets, and instruments. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS & FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL
CONSIDERATIONS
(Oct.
28,
2009),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_091107c.pdf (outlining conceptual and analytical approaches to the
assessment of systemic importance and discussing a possible form for general
guidelines).
343. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 4(3).
344. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183,
at 2; Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 4.
345. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183,
at 3 (explaining that term limits for non-executive board members could be found to
be an excessive intrusion into the rights of shareholders); Letter from Michel
Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 3 (stating that Moody’s complies
with the New York Stock Exchange’s Corporate Governance Listing Standards,
which differ from the EU CRA Regulation’s corporate governance standard).
346. See generally Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra
note 179, at 18; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 23; Letter from Michel Madelain
to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 5.
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The most pressing issue is how strictly the European
regulators will make equivalency determinations. While it
seems probable that exceptions could be made regarding
corporate governance and disclosure requirements, it seems
unlikely that the U.S. regulatory regime would be deemed
equivalent in terms of rating methodologies and the quality of
ratings given the significance EU regulators placed on these
provisions. Specifically, because the United States prohibits
regulators from interfering with the substance of ratings, or the
procedures and methodologies used to determine ratings,347
many of the requirements in the EU CRA Regulation would not
be deemed legal in the United States.348 If this is in fact the
case, U.S. regulators could not adopt these requirements in
order to meet the EU’s equivalence requirements without first
repealing the prohibition. The extraterritorial reach of the EU
CRA Regulation in such a situation is extreme, forcing U.S.
regulators to choose either to limit CRAs based in the United
States who desire to issue ratings for use in the EU to the
endorsement requirements, or to adopt provisions contrary to a
key philosophy underlying its regulation of CRAs.
G. SOLUTIONS: THE NEED FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND
BILATERAL DIALOGUES
Any potential extraterritorial and anti-competitive effects of
the EU CRA Regulation could be substantially reduced if the
European Union adopted an equivalency decision for the United
States and Japan without forcing either country to implement
the EU CRA Regulation in full. Because the regulations in the
United States are essentially designed to achieve the same
ultimate goals as the EU CRA Regulation,349 European
347. See Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (2006).
348. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 1–2
(raising concerns that many of the provisions intrude on CRA independence and
could lead CRAs to be discouraged or prevented from publishing candid and
objective ratings).
349. Compare Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating
Agencies, at 4, COM (2008) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/securities/docs/agencies/proposal_en.pdf (listing avoidance of
conflicts of interest, improving the quality of the methodologies, increasing
transparency, and ensuring efficient registration and surveillance as the four
primary objectives of the legislation), with Amendments to Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74
Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b) (listing
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regulators should deem the U.S. regulations equivalent to the
EU regulation despite differences in the means used to achieve
those goals, as was the case when the EU made prior
equivalency determinations regarding financial reporting
standards.350 The adoption of an equivalency determination is
particularly important if the “at least as stringent” requirement
in the endorsement provisions can only be met when the home
country is deemed equivalent.351 If this is in fact how the
regulation is interpreted, then any CRA whose home country is
not deemed equivalent would be unable to make its ratings
available for use in the European Union without establishing an
affiliate in the EU, registering that entity, and conducting one
hundred percent of its ratings activity in the European Union.352
Such a conclusion could have a catastrophic impact on the
financial markets in the European Union if non-EU based CRAs
were unwilling to conduct all of their European rating activities
in the EU.
The most effective way to minimize potential regulatory
gaps and address the regulatory frictions resulting from
differing regulatory regimes is through international
coordination and bilateral dialogues.353 Regulators in the U.S.,
EU, and around the globe should continue to work together
toward the goals outlined by the G-20, achieving an “oversight
framework . . . consistent across jurisdictions with appropriate
sharing of information between national authorities, including
through IOSCO.”354 Pursuant to these initiatives, “IOSCO has
increasing transparency, strengthening disclosure of ratings performances,
prohibiting certain conflicts of interest, and enhancing recordkeeping and reporting
obligations as the primary goals of the rule amendments).
350. See Council Directive 2008/961, Commission Decision of 12 December 2008
on the Use By Third Countries’ Issuers of Securities of Certain Third Country’s
National Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to
Prepare Their Consolidated Financial Statements, 2008 O.J. (L 340) 112 (EC)
(deeming the U.S. and Japanese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
equivalent to the EU’s International Financial Reporting Standards despite
significant differences).
351. See CESR, Call for Evidence, supra note 141, at 21 (arguing that the “at
least as stringent” requirement for endorsement is the same as the equivalency
determination required for certification).
352. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 4(3)–(5).
353. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n,
Testimony Concerning International Cooperation to Modernize Financial
Regulation, Before the U.S. S. Banking Subcomm. on Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin.
(Sept.
30,
2009),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a3381afe-030b-4c16-97df-d4b3e6d01c96.
354. U.S. CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURGH G-20 SUMMIT, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE
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commenced a dialogue with CRAs and is examining whether
differences in the implementation of national and regional
regulatory frameworks . . . present compliance problems or
arbitrage opportunities.”355 IOSCO is additionally conducting a
regular dialogue between regulators and the CRAs regarding
any implementation problems from the industry’s perspective.356
It is crucial that CRAs and regulators continue to work together
through IOSCO to ensure the regulatory system put in place
meets the needs of investors and regulators alike.
In particular, it is important the U.S. and EU work together
through the U.S.-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue to
ensure that equivalence determinations for CRAs follow an
outcomes-based assessment rather than requiring an exact
duplication of rules.357 This dialogue has been successful in the
past, and members from both the U.S. and EU should use this
forum yet again to ensure that the regulations are as compatible
and as convergent as possible.358 Finally, CESR and the SEC
should put together a plan as quickly as possible to guide the
SEC-CESR dialogue in the immediate future to ensure the
regulation of CRAs is globally consistent.359
CONCLUSION
In less than a decade, credit rating agencies have gone from
self-regulated entities virtually ignored by regulators to entities
subject to detailed regulatory regimes in both the United States
and the EU. Spurred by issues which came to light due to the
subprime mortgage crisis, regulators in both the EU and United
States are seeking to regulate CRAs in order to increase
ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 19 (Sept. 25, 2009), available
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf.
355. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, PROGRESS SINCE THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT IN
IMPLEMENTING THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL
STABILITY 12 (Nov. 7, 2009), available at https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_091107a.pdf.
356. Id. at 12–13.
357. TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COUNCIL, JOINT REPORT ON U.S. – EU
FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATORY DIALOGUE FOR THE TEC MEETING 1–2 (Oct. 27,
2009), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/joint_report_on_fmrd_en.pdf
(stating that U.S. and EU regulators are working together regarding equivalence).
358. Id. at 1.
359. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC and CESR Launch
Work Plan Focused on Financial Reporting (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006/2006-130.htm (describing actions previously taken by the SEC and CESR
to coordinate regulation of international accounting principles).
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transparency, strengthen disclosure, avoid conflicts of interest,
and generally improve the quality of ratings to ensure that the
problems highlighted by the recent financial turmoil are avoided
in the future. While the goals are the same, the EU’s regulatory
regime takes a much more prescriptive approach to regulation
than both the IOSCO Code of Conduct and the U.S. Rating
Agency Act, outlining detailed requirements pertaining to
corporate governance and rating methodologies.
The EU’s divergence from the international regulatory
consensus, as reflected in the IOSCO Code of Conduct, would
not be as significant if the EU CRA Regulation did not mandate
that the regulatory regimes of non-EU CRAs must be deemed
equivalent in order for such non-EU CRAs to issue credit ratings
for use in the European Union. The EU now has the upper-hand
when it comes to regulation of international credit rating
agencies as it decides whether the standards set in other
jurisdictions are sufficient. As a result, even where EU and U.S.
regulations do not currently conflict, the SEC may face pressure
not to adopt new rules for fear of creating conflicts with the EU
regulations that could potentially harm U.S. rating agencies
operating in Europe. It is thus essential that regulators work
together through bilateral dialogues to ensure that the various
regulations are compatible to eliminate the potential adverse
cross-border impact different regulatory approaches may have
on global market participants.

